



The European Union and the Global Counterterrorism Forum: The Importance of Continued Engagement¹

Abstract

This think piece focuses on the achievements and the future of the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF). The piece offers a background on the GCTF and discusses its achievements and continued relevance before looking at how the EU has contributed to and benefited from its dedicated platform for addressing the global threat of terrorism.

It concludes with five core recommendations for the EU to inform and guide its support for and work with the GCTF in the future in light of the evolution of the threat of counterterrorism and violent extremism and changes in leadership at the United Nations and in some GCTF member countries.

These recommendations range from providing core support for the administrative functions of the GCTF to raising awareness of the GCTF's work. In the five years since its establishment in September 2011, the GCTF has provided a venue for civilian-focused rule of law-based counterterrorism and prevention efforts. It has helped to sharpen the focus of multilateral capacity-building efforts, to improve cooperation and coordination as well as knowledge transfer, particularly between western and Muslim-majority countries. The GCTF, for example, has developed a range of best practices that have informed international norms and helped to provide practical guidance for practitioners.

Moreover, the creation of three GCTF-inspired institutions—the International Institute for Justice and the Rule of Law, the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund, and Hedayah, a global center of excellence on countering violent extremism—have also helped to provide outlets for specific practical actions that support discrete elements of the GCTF's mission.

This think piece ends with a handful of core recommendations for the EU to consider taking forward as it continues its engagement with the GCTF in the future.

¹ By Alistair Millar, Executive Director of the Global Center on Cooperative Security, a member of the EU CT Morse consortium.



The European Union and the Global Counterterrorism Forum: The Importance of Continued Engagement

Executive Summary

This think piece provides background on the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) and EU's role as an active member supporting and participating in the GCTF's progress since it was founded in 2011.

The think piece looks at the GCTF's purpose as a dedicated platform for addressing the global threat of terrorism in a more coordinated and reliable way with a focus on capacity building and developing and disseminating good practices in the realm of civilian (distinct from military or covert) counterterrorism activity.

The design of the GCTF is another focus area. The GCTF's Working Groups are the mainstay of its activities. The Horn of Africa Capacity Building Working Group co-chaired by the EU is highlighted along with an overview of three GCTF inspired institutions - the International Institution for Justice and the Rule of Law ([IIJ](#)) as a hub for practical training as it relates to counterterrorism linked to the implementation of GCTF Good Practice documents; a Center of Excellence for Countering Violent Extremism ([Hedayah](#)), a "think and do tank" that supports countering violent extremism (CVE) training, research, and sharing of good practices; and the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund ([GCERF](#)), the only multilateral fund dedicated to financing and supporting local efforts to prevent violent extremism. All three are supported financially by the EU.

The value of the GCTF to the EU is also emphasised. The GCTF aligns well with the EU's own strategic interests, providing a constructive outlet for prompting rule of law-based efforts to counter and prevent the threat of terrorism through awareness raising, training, and other forms of capacity building. Distinct from harder edged initiatives, such as the Saudi Arabia-led Islamic Military Alliance and the Global Coalition Against Daesh, the GCTF is helping to encourage its members and those involved in its activities to recalibrate traditional counterterrorism responses so that they are more holistic and inclusive (involving more than just security forces). Furthermore, the GCTF is designed to support the efforts of the United Nations, in particular the implementation of its Global Counterterrorism Strategy, also clearly in line with EU goals in this regard.

Finally, this think piece looks at some opportunities for the EU to increase its engagement, taking advantage of efforts underway to revitalize the form and function of the GCTF and its Working Groups over the next eight months. Specifically the following recommendations are suggested for consideration:

- 1. Continue and Increase Engagement.** Not just financially but also by encouraging EU member states to contribute more experts as trainers, as well as mentors and secondees;
- 2. Support a stocktaking of the work of the IIJ and Hedayah** to ensure they are having the desired impact and offering a good return on investment;
- 3. Continue as co-chair in one of the revitalized Working Groups;**
- 4. Raise awareness of the GCTF and the work it is doing** to complement the United Nations;
- 5. Help to further improve the utility of the International Counterterrorism/Countering Violent Extremism Clearinghouse Mechanism (ICCM).**



Background

The GCTF was developed in 2010 and launched the following year with the purpose of providing a dedicated platform for addressing the global threat of terrorism in a more coordinated and reliable way with a focus on capacity building and developing and disseminating good practices in the realm of civilian (distinct from military or covert) counterterrorism activity. As a principal architect of the GCTF has noted, “[b]y the end of the decade following 9/11 it had become clear that relying on the existing multilateral system to fight terrorism was not working; a dedicated, built-for-purpose global counterterrorism body was needed to fill the existing gap within international counterterrorism efforts. This was despite modest attempts to update the system through the creation of counterterrorism committees by the UN Security Council and regional bodies such as the Organization of American States.”²

The idea for the GCTF was initiated in the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Counterterrorism and based upon the realization that there were a number of gaps in the international architecture on this issue:

1. Capacity needs were not properly identified and met, despite ongoing but unsuccessful efforts among the United Nations and the now defunct G8’s Counter-Terrorism Action Group to address this issue;
2. There was a dearth of coherent best practices to provide concrete guidance for states to adapt and adopt;
3. There was a lack of engagement with specialized practitioners, with most of the discussion taking place among diplomats at the United Nations and other multilateral fora, rather than among criminal justice officials or other practitioners and policymakers; and
4. Not enough was being done to reach out to key partners—beyond traditional allies—including Muslim-majority countries.

Furthermore, inspired by the comparative success that smaller platforms, such as the [Financial Action Task Force \(FATF\)](#) have enjoyed (with a far more limited membership than the United Nations), the aim of the GCTF was to develop a forum with no more than 30 members to allow for more streamlined interaction focused on practical, technically-focused issues rather than political outcomes. One core aim of the GCTF’s mission is for it to be focused on complementing and reinforcing existing multilateral counterterrorism efforts, including those of the United Nations and relevant regional organizations. In its founding documents, promoting and enhancing the UN’s counterterrorism efforts is explicitly stated by the GCTF as a high priority, with particular attention given to supporting UN member states’ implementation of the [2006 United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy \(the Strategy\)](#).³ Relevant UN bodies and counterterrorism experts have been explicitly encouraged to participate in GCTF activities.

The GCTF was officially launched in New York in September 2011 soon after the tenth anniversary of the 9/11 attacks. The new forum made sense to those who “recognised that in certain contexts projects carrying the ‘US’ hallmark, or that of any other Western nation would, by definition, have limited impact. Instead there was a need for durable multilateral platforms to

² Eric Rosand, “Minding the Gap: A Multi-Layered Approach to Tackling Violent Extremism,” RUSI Newsbrief 36, no. 4, July 2016, pp 24-26, https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/2016_newsbrief_july_rosand.pdf.

³ UN General Assembly, *United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy*, A/RES/60/288, 20 September 2006 (adopted 8 September 2006).



support training on the different GCTF guidance documents.”⁴ The GCTF has a fairly small but diverse membership and it has deliberately established informal partnerships with various UN bodies and other relevant regional and functional organizations, including the African Union and Interpol, respectively. To date, more than 90 nonmember countries have participated in one or more GCTF activity.

One important feature of the GCTF is its focus on civilian counterterrorism activities. This aligns well with the EU’s own strategic interests by providing a constructive outlet for prompting rule of law-based efforts to counter and prevent the threat of terrorism through awareness raising, training, and other forms of capacity building. Distinct from harder edged initiatives, such as the Saudi Arabia-led Islamic Military Alliance and the Anti-ISIL Coalition, the GCTF is helping to encourage its members and those involved in its activities to recalibrate traditional counterterrorism responses so that they are more holistic and inclusive (involving more than just security forces). For example, GCTF initiatives are bringing parliamentarians, nongovernmental actors, and others to the table in a way that reinforces the [EU’s own principles](#) on governance, oversight, and participation on matters related to the security sector, sustainable development, and human rights.

The United States and Turkey served as the first overall co-chairs (replaced by the Netherlands and Morocco in 2015). [Six Working Groups \(originally five\)](#) were also established and co-chaired among various GCTF members (one a western country and the other a Muslim-majority country working in tandem) to cover an array of regional and thematic issues.

The original Working Groups covered two themes: [Countering Violent Extremism](#) (co-chaired by the United Arab Emirates and United Kingdom); and [Criminal Justice and the Rule of Law](#) (co-chaired by Egypt and the United States). Three regions were also covered. [The Sahel Capacity-Building](#) (co-chaired by Algeria and Canada); the [Horn of Africa Capacity-Building](#) (co-chaired by the EU and Turkey); and Southeast Asia (co-chaired by Australia and Indonesia). The Southeast Asia Working Group was subsequently transformed with the same co-chairs into a thematic group, focusing on [detention and reintegration](#). In 2014 an additional thematic Working Group was established on the issue of [foreign terrorist fighters](#) (FTFs) (co-chaired by Morocco and the Netherlands).

The GCTF established an administrative (Admin) Unit, which provides support for GCTF activities including organizing events, maintaining the website and the intranet portal, as well conducting outreach and following-up as necessary. The Admin Unit was hosted in and paid for by the United States, using an independent contractor until 2015. It is now hosted in the Netherlands with ongoing financial support from the United States as well as the Netherlands and Morocco.

The EU and Turkey co-chair the Horn of Africa Capacity-Building Working Group, but as is noted later in this think piece, the Working Groups and their co-chair assignments are expected to be revitalized in the process scheduled to culminate by September 2017. The GCTF was also at the vanguard of countering violent extremism (CVE) efforts with the creation of a CVE Working Group in 2011.

The GCTF has supported the establishment of three “GCTF-Inspired” institutions: the International Institution for Justice and the Rule of Law ([III](#)) as a hub for practical training as it relates to counterterrorism linked to the implementation of GCTF Good Practice documents; the Center of Excellence on Countering Violent Extremism ([Hedayah](#)), a “think and do tank” that supports CVE training, research, and sharing of good practices; and the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund ([GCERF](#)), the only multilateral fund dedicated to financing and

⁴ Rosand, “Minding the Gap,” p. 25.



supporting local efforts to prevent violent extremism. All three institutions are now up and running. In the framework of the IIJ over 2,000 judges, prosecutors, investigators, parliamentarians, and other criminal justice professionals have participated in over 50 international programs since it started in June 2014.⁵ GCERF is currently funding local community-based projects aimed at preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) in Mali, Nigeria, and Bangladesh through twelve principal recipients as conduits for providing small grants to 69 sub-recipients. Support for additional projects in Kenya, Kosovo, and Myanmar as well as an innovative private sector co-financing initiative is currently under preparation.⁶ Hedayah focused its initial activities on establishing a venue for collaboration among experts and researchers, hosting an annual exposition, and conducting trainings and seminars in its own facilities in Abu Dhabi on issues ranging from the development of national CVE strategies to community engagement (focused especially on women, youth, and families). The next phase of Hedayah's work includes more focus on developing its research networks and facilities as well as a virtual library to stimulate in-depth work to elicit more evidence about radicalization and its prevention. It would also be helpful if Hedayah could do more to reach out to other countries in the Middle East and more actively involve them in its activities and initiatives.

The GCTF's Achievements

There have been a number of notable achievements by the GCTF since it was established.

First, the GCTF has developed and sustained a **network of expert practitioners**, which is in keeping with the GCTF's original [mission](#) to "mobilize the necessary expertise and resources to address such needs." The Good Practices have also helped to engage practitioners with specific expertise on issues ranging from law enforcement to parliamentary oversight and community engagement. This has helped to take these types of discussions in multilateral fora—that are often attended by foreign ministry personnel—and allow for more substantive and practical interaction by experts that highlights best practices and flags challenges to overcome. Having an array of perspectives from experts from different countries including Muslim-majority countries has also helped to enable interactive two-way knowledge transfer among participants to share and learn from their specific experiences as practitioners. This has also helped to underscore the value of in-kind contributions other than just reinforce the financial aspects and donor-recipient interplay.

Second, the GCTF has developed an **array of Good Practice documents** in the form of memoranda on issues including: [effective counterterrorism practice in the criminal justice sector](#); [a multi-sectoral approach to countering violent extremism](#); [rehabilitation and reintegration of violent extremist offenders](#); [assistance to victims of terrorism](#); and [denying the benefits of kidnap for ransom](#), among [others](#). All of these Good Practice documents provide a useful framework to guide principled application for civilian-led counterterrorism and CVE initiatives and many have been endorsed or otherwise recognized by the UN Security Council. Furthermore, UN Security Council Resolution 2178 of September 2014 on foreign terrorist fighters⁷ was in large part cut and pasted from the GCTF's Hague-Marrakech Memorandum⁸ developed four months earlier,

⁵ International Institute for Justice and the Rule of Law, "Annual Report," 2016, https://theijj.org/wp-content/uploads/III-AnnualReport_EN_Low-Res.pdf.

⁶ Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund, "2015 Annual Report," <http://www.gcerf.org/wp-content/uploads/GCERF-ANNUAL-REPORT-2015.pdf>.

⁷ UN Security Council, S/RES/2178, 24 September 2014.

⁸ Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF), "'Foreign Terrorist Fighters' (FTF) Initiative: The Hague-Marrakech Memorandum on Good Practices for a More Effective Response to the FTF Phenomenon," n.d., https://www.thegctf.org/documents/10162/140201/14Sept19_The+Hague-Marrakech+FTF+Memorandum.pdf.



which presents a set of good practices for addressing the FTF phenomenon under four major headings: (1) radicalization to violent extremism; (2) recruitment and facilitation; (3) travel and fighting; and (4) return and reintegration. The GCTF then reinforced the resolution by developing a GCTF Initiative to Address the Life Cycle of Radicalization to Violence, including its Toolkit. Going forward it would help if the GCTF's assets are used to help further improve coordination and cement action, making use of its Good Practice documents,⁹ working with the United Nations to support and reinforce mandates, but also getting on with the GCTF's core business without waiting for the UN to deliberate and in many cases fail to follow up.

The GCTF's International Counterterrorism/Countering Violent Extremism Clearinghouse Mechanism (ICCM) shows some promise in that direction by helping to provide more information to facilitate coordination and reduce overlap. The EU could help to improve the utility of the ICCM by setting an example for its member states to follow by regularly providing up-to-date information to the ICCM and encouraging others to do so as well.

Assessment

The GCTF adds **strategic, cross cutting value on issues** that are often compartmentalized into silos that hamper multidisciplinary collaboration and innovation. The GCTF has rather successfully combined the broad agenda of issues related to more traditional civilian counterterrorism and more nascent measures focused on preventing violent extremism. Combined with the array of expert practitioners mentioned above, the GCTF has created a dynamic where those involved in the GCTF—from recipients of trainings all the way up to high-level political leaders—have become exposed to the strategic breadth of the topics and policies that comprise the modern holistic approach to the threat. The scope for strategic and cross-cutting approaches has also characterized the work of the geographic and thematic Working Groups. The GCTF thematic Working Groups focused on CVE, rule of law, or reintegration of violent extremist offenders, for example, have provided a space for discussing specific issues in depth. They have also looked at the linkages between the issues addressed in each Working Group and then fed their progress on activities (from research to trainings) back into the wider GCTF during biannual plenary and coordinating meetings, as well as weekly updates sent via email from the GCTF Admin Unit. Similarly, geographic Working Groups in Southeast Asia, East Africa, and the Sahel have used their plenary meetings to formulate and implement work plans that often cover the range of issues addressed by the wider GCTF. GCTF initiatives, such as the [Life Cycle of Radicalization Tool Kit](#) have also helped to integrate prevention, detection and intervention, and rehabilitation and reintegration efforts. This level of interaction across the gamut of CVE and counterterrorism-related issues was implicit in the intent of the Strategy, but the United Nations has not been nearly as efficient in combining work across all four pillars of the Strategy since it was adopted in 2006.

Enhancing coordination is one of the core reasons the GCTF was established. It has indeed provided a platform for bringing its members together to inform each other of what they are doing as donors in some cases and as recipients of capacity building in other cases. It has also helped to enhance the influence on and impact of the United Nations, as the GCTF Good Practices on CVE, FTFs, and kidnap for ransom led to UN Security Council action on each topic.

The process of coordination is always difficult and remains a work in progress, but the development of tools such as the GCTF-initiated ICCM is an important development. The ICCM is a

⁹ All Good Practice documents are available online at the GCTF. See: <https://www.thegctf.org/About-us/GCTF-documents>.



database of recent and ongoing counterterrorism and CVE capacity-building assistance, which will help to identify gaps in programming, de-conflict overlapping programs, and help to mobilize and guide donor resources through nonbinding recommendations. The tool will also “support the implementation of GCTF good practices, the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, and the wider UN CT and CVE framework.”¹⁰

Finally, the array of Good Practices have been used and adapted by GCTF and non-GCTF members, for example [in East Africa and South Asia](#). They have also helped to engage practitioners with specific expertise on issues ranging from law enforcement to parliamentary oversight and community engagement to name a few. However, with exception of the Doha community policing good practices the Good Practice documents do not provide any specific practical examples. In 2013-14 the U.S. Department of State supported the development of concrete examples in the criminal justice sector, which led to the publication of an assessment of the national implementation of rule of law-based criminal justice measures to counter terrorism in Africa, the Middle East, and South and Southeast Asia.¹¹ This process and outcome would be useful to complement other GCTF Good Practices. The EU should consider supporting such research in areas of the most relevance to the EU’s own interest and experience in the fields of development and counterterrorism, including issues such as community-policing that occupy the nexus between the two.

EU Support to the GCTF and the Institutions it has inspired

For the first five years of the GCTF’s operation the European Union and Turkey have been the co-chairs of the [Horn of Africa Capacity-Building Working Group](#). The Working Group has convened five annual plenary meetings with most of its focus on three core thematic issues (as also reflected in the [EU Counter-terrorism Action Plan for the Horn of Africa and Yemen from 2012](#)): anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism; countering violent extremism; and criminal justice and rule of law capacity building. In the last two years there have been specific events to enable core nongovernmental constituencies to highlight their needs, good practices, and challenges. In March 2015 there was an “Exposition of Counter-Terrorism Efforts in the Horn of Africa” in Kampala, Uganda. The expo brought together national, regional, and international experts; government officials; program managers; and representatives from the diplomatic community to share experiences and good practices from ongoing relevant capacity-building efforts and to present a practical demonstration of their work. In 2016 a plenary was held in Djibouti where the EU supported a youth symposium focused on youth-led organizations and other relevant civil society organizations.

The EU has benefited from its chairmanship of the Horn of Africa Capacity-Building Working Group in several ways. It has been able to refine and highlight its own support for relevant projects in the region. The EU has also been able to stay abreast of other capacity-building efforts undertaken by other GCTF members and the United Nations in the region. This has enabled the EU to build upon and sustain shorter-term bilateral programming¹² and to develop a division of labor to help ensure that there is more impact and less duplication of efforts in the Horn.

¹⁰ GCTF, “International Counterterrorism/Countering Violent Extremism Clearinghouse Mechanism,” n.d., <https://www.thegctf.org/Cross-Cutting-Initiatives/International-Counterterrorism-Countering-Violent-Extremism-Clearinghouse-Mechanism>.

¹¹ Matthew Schwartz, et al., “Strengthening the Case: Good Criminal Justice Practices to Counter Terrorism,” Global Center on Cooperative Security, September 2015, <http://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Strengthening-the-case-high-res.pdf>.

¹² For example the EU built upon bilateral capacity-building projects on Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) supported by Denmark and the United States in Kenya by developing a region-wide AML/CFT project.



Furthermore, the Horn of Africa Capacity-Building Working Group has helped to foster better coordination among donors in the region, with intercessional meetings on specific issues such as improving the capacity of countries in East Africa to address money laundering and terrorist financing.

The EU has also been an active supporter of the three GCTF-inspired institutions. To help the IJ to get off to a good start, the EU funded the research and dissemination of a [Needs-based Curricula and Programme Development for the International Institute for Justice and the Rule of Law](#). Furthermore, the EU has recommended experts from EU institutions, including the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training (CEPOL) and from EU member states to deliver trainings at the institute. EU support for GCERF has also been significant and is ongoing. Beginning in 2014 the European Commission has supported three million euros' worth of funding to support subgrants awarded by GCERF. Support from the EU to Hedayah includes a five million euro grant for Hedayah to work with local partners through subgrants to design, implement, and develop approaches that will lead to a demonstrable impact on the threat posed by radicalization and recruitment to terrorism.

Should the EU continue its engagement with the GCTF?

The value of the GCTF has been noted above. With the EU as a founding member of the GCTF and the only organization being a full member, the GCTF has provided a platform for the EU to promote and stimulate efforts in key third countries and regions (not least the Middle East and North Africa) to build capacity on issues at the heart of the EU's own values such as strengthening the rule of law, and promoting community engagement to prevent terrorism.

To ensure that this value continues will require the active support of a donor with considerable influence and relatively deep pockets to help weather some anticipated changes to the GCTF in the near future.

First, the GCTF Working Groups will be revitalized with an updated structure in place by September 2017 including widening the scope of the geographic Working Groups (the Horn of Africa and the Sahel) to reflect a broader geographic focus by adding “/Neighboring Regions” to their titles to allow for the inclusion of other areas in Africa, such as the Lake Chad basin and the Middle East, (including the Red Sea littoral). There is also interest in conducting a year-long review of the Working Groups to ensure that they are more closely aligned. Furthermore, although not mentioned in the co-chair's paper, there has been some discussion of the possibility of expanding the chairmanship of the regional Working Groups from two co-chairs to three, with the third chair being a non-GCTF member, which could allow for an eventual expansion of the GCTF to include those new co-chair countries.

Second, with the Trump Administration poised to take office on 20 January it is not clear what level of political and financial support the United States will provide the GCTF (at least in its current form and functions); some fear that such support is likely to diminish, however, the fact that it is a flexible, action-oriented platform outside of the UN system may appeal to the new team. Elections in other countries will likely have less impact, but could also portend a change or slackening of commitment to support the GCTF and its current mission in the future. Against this backdrop, the EU and the rest of the GCTF membership should renew their commitment to ensure that the political developments in the U.S. or elsewhere will not impair an institution that, regardless of its political origins, came to fulfil a much needed role in the counterterrorism space and that over time developed its own institutional identity. Given its institutional and political leverage, the EU could and should play a very important role in this regard. The U.S. has been an active member of the GCTF and a key driver of its policies and strategies since its inception; in the event of a decrease in their engagement and support to the GCTF—and even perhaps



independently from that possible outcome—the EU must stand ready to help bridge the gap, and do what it can to guarantee that the GCTF and its inspired institutions are not only capable of accomplishing their original mission of supporting rule of law-compliant capacity building and good practices in furthering efforts to implement the Strategy, but that they also remain adaptive and responsive to the needs of an increasingly challenging terrorist threat.

So far, the United States has provided financing to run the GCTF Admin Unit (approximately USD 1 million). Since the change in chairmanship, the Netherlands and Morocco have also supported administrative costs including for example the plenary and ministerial meetings. As an insurance policy of sorts, the EU should consider also contributing to the GCTF Admin Unit going forward. Currently the United States funds a lot of capacity-building programs/workshops explicitly linked to GCTF Good Practices. Other donors, including the EU, should start doing more of this to ensure that the GCTF has the necessary capacity for the years to come.

Recommendations

- 1. Continue and increase engagement.** Not just financially but also by encouraging EU member states to contribute more experts as trainers, as well as mentors and secondees in institutions that would benefit from proven EU expertise, including national police and judicial training academies or financial intelligence units, for example;
- 2. Support a stocktaking of the work of the IIJ and Hedayah.** GCERF has hired an independent consultant to interview GCERF board members, staff, fund recipients, and other stakeholders. The results should be published and made available to the EU and other GCERF board members shortly. Similar reviews should also be conducted for the other two GCTF-inspired institutions and the EU should help to fund those studies to ensure that Hedayah and the IIJ are having the desired impact and offering a good return on investment from the EU and other donors who support them;
- 3. Continue as co-chair in one of the Working Groups** and mobilize the required in-house support for it;
- 4. Raise awareness of the GCTF and the work it is doing** to complement the United Nations. Use the EU's political dialogue with third countries as well as interaction with multilateral organizations around the world to highlight the importance of the work the GCTF and its inspired institutions are doing, or have the potential to do, to work in a more holistic way to prevent and counter violent extremism; and
- 5. Help to further improve the utility of the International Counterterrorism/Countering Violent Extremism Clearinghouse Mechanism (ICCM)** by setting an example for its member states to follow by regularly providing up-to-date information to the ICCM and encouraging others to do so as well.