The European Union's Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP)

Strengthening Resilience to Violent Extremism – STRIVE (Horn of Africa)

## *Evaluation report*

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Evaluation Report

Strengthening Resilience to Violent Extremism – STRIVE (Horn of Africa)

Client: Royal United Services Institute/European Commission

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Front cover photograph courtesy of Boniface Mwangi.

Abbreviations

CICC	Coast Interfaith Council of Clerics
CIPK	Council of Imams and Preachers of Kenya
CVE	Countering Violent Extremism
CT	Counter Terrorism
DAC	Development Assistance Committee (OECD)
DMFA	Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs
EU	European Union
EC	European Commission
FCO	UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office
GCTF	Global Counter Terrorism Forum
HoA	Horn of Africa
IfS	Instrument for Stability
IGAD	Inter-Governmental Authority on Development
NCTC	National Counter Terrorism Centre (Kenya)
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NKE	Non Key Expert
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OTI	US Office for Transition Initiatives
PET	(Danish) Police Intelligence Agency
RUSI	Royal United Services Institute
STRIVE	Strengthening Resilience to Violent Extremism
SUPKEM	Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims
ToR	Terms of Reference
UN	United Nations
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

Executive Summary

This report provides the findings of an external evaluation of the "Strengthening Resilience to Violent Extremism" (STRIVE) project in the Horn of Africa, which is being implemented by the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) on behalf of the European Union (EU). The project commenced in January 2014 and will run until January 2017 (36 months) within an overall budget of €2 million. It interacts and works with civil society organisations as well as government authorities from primarily Kenya and the regions of Somaliland and Puntland in Somalia. STRIVE aims to develop best practices to implement and monitor activities that strengthen resilience against extremism and violence.[1]

STRIVE (HoA) was set up to start the EU's engagement in the field of CVE, to build up expertise, to contribute to international exchanges on best practice, and to cooperate with other relevant actors in the field of CVE which, it should be highlighted, is often sensitive and regarding which knowledge is still developing.

The project has used a number of pilot activities as vehicles for producing results and learning. These have included: capacity building of law enforcement and support for cooperation between civil society and state authorities (in Kenya); research and activities relating to the role of women in CVE (in Puntland and Somaliland); research and activities aimed at reducing the risk that local and diaspora youth in Somaliland become radicalised; mentoring from civil society experts in slum areas of Nairobi; inter-faith dialogue in the Kenyan Coastal Region; support for moderate religious voices in Kenya; and support for communication, including through radio.

This evaluation has been asked to assess the extent to which the project activities are contributing to overall objectives, how learning from conducting pilot activities has taken place, and how the project is producing learning that contributes to the design, delivery and implementation of future programmes to counter violent extremism. The evaluation team was also asked to explore how STRIVE has contributed to international best practice and standards development for CVE, as well as how it has built up expertise and experience within the EU system. The evaluation team has utilised a mixed methods approach to answering these questions, including field work in Kenya and Somaliland in September 2016.

The evaluation finds that STRIVE's activities in Kenya have been relevant to the EU's Counter Terrorism Action Plan for the Horn of Africa and Yemen and to the contexts in which they have been located. The Horn of Africa region continues to host terrorist groups and has areas that include populations who are highly vulnerable to recruitment, particularly youth. The project has focused on localities in Kenya (Eastleigh and in the Coastal Region) that are particularly vulnerable, as well as in Somaliland and to a lesser extent Puntland. It should be recognised that pursuing politically and culturally sensitive objectives (such as CVE) in these environments is challenging and requires specific technical and management expertise.

Document research and interviews indicate that the pilots have achieved a number of positive results and are contributing to learning on what works in CVE. Promising pilot projects include the curriculum development and training activities with the Kenyan National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC) – which are increasing law enforcement's understanding of CVE and which, when further rolled out (in STRIVE II), should have an impact on front-line policing and other law enforcement;

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[1] A second phase of the project (STRIVE II) is currently being developed and is expected to take forward the most successful of the original pilots.

mentoring – which has directly involved individuals at risk of becoming radicalised and has reduced this risk; support to alternative voices (moderate imams) – through production of a sermon guide that can make sermons more relevant to young people and thus contribute to reducing the pull of radical mosques; and communications – where the Radio Salam pilot has brought violent extremism issues to a large pool of listeners in Kenya and is contributing to a more informed public debate.

The evaluation finds that STRIVE has contributed to learning. With relatively modest financial and human resources available, the project has sought to test different approaches to CVE and in different contexts (some more permissive than others). Its most marked successes (e.g. the mentoring pilot) confirm the relevance of the approach taken (e.g. underlining the importance of careful selection of mentees and use of experienced and respected mentors). The pilots have also confirmed that the establishment of "trust" (for example, between trainers and trainees, between mentors and mentees, and law enforcement officers and civil society actors) is a key ingredient for being able to achieve results, especially when working in sensitive environments such as Eastleigh, Kenya Coast and Somaliland. Other pilots (the inter-faith dialogue pilot and the women's and youth pilots in Somaliland, for example) confirm that the choice of partner can be critical and that in some locations (e.g. Somaliland and Puntland) this choice is limited. Nonetheless, these pilots have contributed a variety of important lessons; in particular relating to how external interventions on CVE, gender and youth can overcome the significant cultural barriers that exist.

The evaluation team also finds that STRIVE has contributed in a number of ways to increasing the EU's knowledge about CVE and radicalisation in the Horn of Africa region as well as thematically. This includes experience on designing, implementing and monitoring CVE programmes, as well as experience on cooperating with national authorities on sensitive topics. STRIVE also helped to better understand the capacity of governmental and especially non-governmental partners in Kenya, Somaliland and Puntland and this can inform the future selection of implementing partners for CVE activities. The dissemination of learning has been a core feature of STRIVE's regular reporting to the EC in Brussels; STRIVE's six monthly reports have included updated threat assessments, progress updates from the various results areas, and sections on lessons learned. The team finds that the latter have been insightful and are likely to be of wider use (i.e. beyond STRIVE).

The report concludes with a number of forward-looking recommendations concerning the design and delivery of CVE projects in more general terms, the EU engagement in CVE, and the thematic result areas under STRIVE.

In relation to CVE project design and delivery:

a. **It is recommended that CVE projects systematically adopt a theory of change approach during project design that makes assumptions explicit.** This should take its outset in a mapping of actors and clearly focus on at-risk groups and their concerns in order to distinguish CVE interventions from other forms of activity, such as peacebuilding (where there can be considerable overlap). Project relevance is strengthened through inclusive, participatory approaches that secure local buy-in. Arrangements for building trust with the target audience should be prioritised and built into the project, as trust is often a precondition for attitudinal and behavioural change and thus CVE-relevant outcomes and impact. For example, language must be tailored to local sensitivities and efforts made to avoid stereotyping beneficiary groups.

b. **It is recommended that programming includes baseline research and arrangements for monitoring throughout project implementation that identifies and validates change assumptions and provides data in response to CVE relevant indicators, thus helping to provide evidence of what works and the pre-conditions involved.** To the extent feasible, the team recommends involving the same experts in the baseline research and project monitoring in order to promote consistency of approach as well as confidence and trust amongst stakeholders and believes that a constant engagement of experts would be beneficial for any pilot for the same reasons. The team notes that large-scale perception surveys, while considered beneficial and a valuable way to assess attitudinal change, are likely to be costly.

c. **It is recommended to engage in systematic risk assessment before and during project implementation in order to understand and mitigate risks as much as possible and promote project impact.** Risk categories include contextual, programmatic, and institutional risks, the latter including personal and reputational risks. STRIVE has demonstrated the relevance of thematically competent and politically neutral implementing partner(s) with previous project management experience.

d. **It is recommended to adopt a pilot project approach for the first engagement in a new geographical location that allows for trial and error provided that sufficiently rigorous monitoring arrangements are in place to learn from it**. STRIVE has demonstrated that some contexts are decidedly less permissive than others, emphasising that tailored approaches are needed. The inclusion of an inception phase during project implementation, during which the approach can be tested and finalised has also proven very useful and should be replicated. The focus on learning remains highly relevant in any future CVE project and can be supported by a strong focus on M&E.

e. **It is recommended to have funding available to immediately extend successful pilot projects and thereby maintain the momentum generated (thus strengthening the scope for achieving sustainable results).** Equally, there is a need to prepare for exit from pilots that will not be continued. Risks associated with an exit that is not adequately prepared may include frustration, exposure, incomplete process amongst beneficiaries etc.

f. **Adequate human resources should be made available, especially if CVE projects cover more than one country and/or operate in hard-to-access countries and locations.** If testing pilot approaches is a main focus, the funding agency and selected implementer should consider including a full-time M&E officer position, whose sole responsibility would be to accompany all project work with advice on monitoring and evaluation, to ensure maximum learning from all work and to ensure the quality of implementing partners' work and reporting.

g. **As local partners may experience capacity constraints (CVE related and/or project management), the implementing partner should be prepared to also provide a capacity development and/or mentoring role in these respects**. STRIVE's experience with the capacity of local partners was mixed and, in certain locations, the project had to choose between either not working on CVE or working with those CSOs that were present already. This was particularly the case in Somaliland and Puntland. Through providing an element of capacity development and following this through with longer term mentoring, overall effectiveness can be increased.

In relation to the EU's CVE engagement:

h. **Within the EU system, it is recommended to ensure maximum cohesion with other EU funding instruments.** For example, a regional focus of STRIVE activities in the coastal region in Kenya would likely benefit from a strong link with the EU's development support in this region (e.g. with economic development support) to achieve synergies and increased impact of both approaches.

i. **It is recommended to systematise dissemination and information sharing within the EU system to ensure that the relevant EU Delegations have full access to all project reporting and have an opportunity to respond to reports.** Also, wider learning within the EU system and amongst the donor community in Africa and beyond could be promoted through wider sharing of project reporting. There would be considerable value in improving coordination amongst donors and implementers and STRIVE would be a good catalyst in this regard.

Concerning the thematic areas covered by STRIVE:

j. **In relation to law enforcement, it is important that sensitisation and capacity development initiatives reach down to front line officers in hot spot areas and their station commanders and are complemented by inter-agency cooperation and institutional change with the aim that performance across relevant agencies and interaction with communities is enhanced.** Achieving this requires political will. STRIVE's experience demonstrates that non-state actors can play an active role but it needs to be backed up politically and administratively (via an MOU for instance). With state agencies also active in this area (agency to agency cooperation), it is relevant to establish coordination fora amongst the donors/implementers concerned. Regarding beneficiary linkages, STRIVE has demonstrated the value in securing a centrally placed counterpart (the NCTC) and nurturing the relationship. The experience suggests that under the right conditions, it is feasible to include other national actors (CSOs) in the arrangement.

k. **In relation to counter radicalisation efforts concerning women and youth, it is recommended to undertake rigorous research into cultural and social norms in the localities concerned so that pre-conditions for change are exposed and can be addressed during project design.** STRIVE has demonstrated that there are significant differences between Somaliland and Kenya (Somaliland being generally more conservative), implying that different approaches are needed. Actor mapping should highlight potential influencers (positive and negative). As one moves from group focused initiatives (e.g. dialogue) to ones more focused on individuals (e.g. mentoring), there will be a need to identify possibilities for referral.

l. **Concerning individuals identified as being at-risk, it is recommended to include initiatives providing mentoring by credible experts who are able to develop a relationship of trust and confidence with the individual(s) concerned.** The team has identified a number of important findings from the STRIVE 1 pilot, including that initiatives prioritise the use of credible and capable mentors who enjoy local respect, are individually targeted and needs/incentives based, and allow sufficient time for the development of trust between mentor and mentee and follow up. Peer influencing

approaches may also be worth considering provided they are supervised. It is critical that the mentors concerned have capacity and credibility to perform their roles and that a medium/long term approach is used that extends to monitoring so that evidence of sustainable change is available. The team is conscious that mentors (and mentees) place themselves at personal risk due to the targeting of extremist organisations (n.b. this may argue against strong local anchoring in some cases). Mentoring initiatives should adopt a do-no-harm approach that systematically assesses and monitors risk.

m. **In relation to preventative communications, the evaluation recommends continuing to cooperate with journalists in order to promote good and responsible media coverage of CVE relevant information, especially following violent incidents**. In addition to the current work with print and TV journalists, engagement with social media and social media influencers should be explored. The team observes that there needs to be a strong analytical basis of programming so that relevant themes and target groups are identified and that data is collected to assess the impact of transmissions on these groups. The Radio Salam pilot suggests that the choice of radio station is important (there needs to be an audience and the audience needs to be relevant). Presenters need to be sufficiently experienced (also thematically). Support from a media expert with CVE experience appears useful in helping to focus programming. While radio remains a relevant medium in Kenya, social media is also growing in importance.

1 Introduction

This report provides the findings of an external evaluation of the "Strengthening Resilience to Violent Extremism" (STRIVE) project in the Horn of Africa, which is being implemented by the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) on behalf of the European Union (EU). The project commenced in January 2014 and will run until January 2017 (36 months) with an overall budget of €2 million. It interacts and works with civil society organisations as well as government authorities from primarily Kenya and the regions of Somaliland and Puntland in Somalia.

STRIVE aims to develop best practices to implement and monitor pilot activities that strengthen resilience against extremism and violence. As such, it has used a number of pilot activities as vehicles for testing approaches, producing results and learning (best practices).

The evaluation team has been asked to assess the extent to which the project activities are contributing to overall objectives, how learning from conducting pilot activities has taken place, and how the project is producing learning that contributes to the design, delivery and implementation of future programmes to Counter Violent Extremism (CVE). The team was also asked to explore how STRIVE has contributed to international best practice and standards development for CVE, as well as how it has built up expertise and experience within the EU system.

The report is organised into five chapters. Following this introduction, Chapter 2 provides an overview of the STRIVE project, including its main intervention areas. Chapter 3 provides a summary of the methodology and approach used by the evaluation team. Chapter 4 provides the evaluation's main findings in response to the evaluation questions, as well as reflections on other key issues, such as project design and project management. Finally, in Chapter 5, we provide a series of recommendations.

The evaluation has been undertaken by Julian Brett and André Kahlmeyer, who are independent consultants contracted by RUSI. The evaluation team would like to thank the STRIVE project staff in Nairobi, project partners and Non Key Experts (NKEs), and other stakeholders consulted for their contributions and assistance, which has helped facilitate the team's work. The team alone is responsible for the content of this report.

2 Overview of the STRIVE project

2.1 The process leading to the project

In 2012, the European Commission decided to engage in the thematic sector of CVE and selected two pilot regions for that: (a) Horn of Africa (understood to include Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Uganda) and (b) Pakistan. The main objectives were to learn, to "try out pilot approaches" to build up EU internal knowledge and capacities, as well as to contribute to global standards on CVE. Explicitly, a "trial and error" approach was permitted where it was "acceptable to fail" with pilot approaches, as long as sufficiently learning from it was ensured.[2]

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[2] Interview with EC DEVCO

In relation to the Horn of Africa pilot, a formulation study was launched in 2012 to define the precise geographic scope for the project taking into consideration on-going CVE activities from other actors, to provide analysis and guidance for the project to develop best practices for CVE and counter radicalisation, and to prepare for a service contract for its implementation. The formulation study reported its initial findings during a two-day CVE workshop in Brussels in November 2012 and the final Formulation Study was submitted in January 2013.[3] The study findings were then fed into terms of reference and, following a tender process, a service contract was awarded to RUSI. There followed an inception phase lasting about 6 months, during which the final project approach was finalised (see 2.3 below).

2.2   Project objectives and project method

STRIVE's overall project objective is *to prevent terrorism and to counter violent extremism while continuing to respect human rights and international law.* The specific objective and purpose of the project is *to develop best practices to implement and monitor pilot activities that aim to have demonstrable impact on strengthening resilience against extremism and violence in the Horn of Africa.*[4] According to the project's terms of reference, this goal was to be approached through four result areas:

1. Build the regional capacity of security sector & law enforcement authorities to engage with civil society in fighting violent extremism (initially intended to cover Ethiopia, Kenya, and Somalia).
2. Strengthened capacity of women's organisations in Puntland & Somaliland to fight violent extremism.
3. Increase the understanding of the challenges faced by EU born Somali youth in Somaliland (intended to focus on Hargeisa, Boroma, Bura'o and Los Anod).
4. Increase the understanding of the drivers of radicalisation among youth in Kenya (intended to focus on the Eastleigh District of Nairobi and its environs, including Majengo and the North Coast of Kenya, including Mombasa). This result area consists of a number of separate pilot projects (mentorship, interfaith dialogue, alternative voices, Radio Salam, and research).

A fifth area was subsequently added concerning preventative communications and, although included initially, education was removed because it was considered overly ambitious.

For each Result Area, three steps were foreseen:

a. A research phase to map the issue and possible interventions
b. A pilot phase during which activities are implemented, and
c. An evaluation phase, when systematic learning and assessment takes place.

STRIVE has been managed by a small project team located in Nairobi consisting of one full time international team leader and one assistant position (subsequently split into two part time positions). This team has been responsible for initiating, overseeing and reporting on all project activities as well as for managing project finances. In addition, the Team Leader has undertaken a significant amount of international travel, both in relation to project activities and in order to promote STRIVE and interact with other CVE actors. RUSI headquarters in London has been responsible for overall contract management, including contact with the client (the European Commission - DEVCO). The

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[3] Formulation study for CVE interventions in the Horn of Africa, January 2013
[4] STRIVE ToR (IFS/2013/ 323-676), 2014. These objectives also feature in the revised LFA (six month report, August 2014).

project team has reported regularly to DEVCO in Brussels (six monthly reports) on project progress. These reports have also included findings in relation to lessons being learned.

Due to the nature of this EU Service Contract, RUSI has not been able to sub-contract work to other organisations directly and has instead hired individuals (Non Key Experts - NKEs) to function as sub-consultants for the individual pilots. The evaluation team note, however, that in many cases these experts have been attached to organisations (mainly NGOs) and have thus been able to draw upon their networks and support. All the NKEs have operated according to terms of reference and contracts developed by the STRIVE team and relating to their intended roles.

2.3   Overview of Result Areas

This section provides an overview of the main result areas, including their thematic focus. As none of the pilot projects have utilised explicit theories of change, we have developed indicative change models in order to aid understanding of the assumptions being made. These are included in the text below.

2.3.1   Result area 1 – promoting interaction between law enforcement and civil society

This result area had the objective to *build the regional (primarily Kenyan) capacity of security sector & law enforcement authorities and civil society to engage with each other in preventing violent extremism.* In cooperation with the National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC), a body that has an overall coordinating role in relation to Kenyan CVE and counter terrorism activities, STRIVE has supported the development of a general CVE training curriculum and its delivery (piloting) amongst law enforcement agencies. A further initiative has concerned training and the further development of civil society coordination based around a (civil society) charter on accountability and advocacy.[5] In both sub-areas, an effort has been made to encourage interaction between law enforcement and civil society (for example, through mutual participation in respective trainings/dialogue events).

There are two complementary <u>theories of change</u> behind Result Area 1. The first one is that *if* law enforcement agencies and personnel are made aware of violent extremism drivers and possible CVE responses, including the role that civil society can play, *then* their awareness of inclusive approaches to CVE will increase and their attitude and behaviour towards civil society and communities will become more collaborative and inclusive, *leading* to more positive citizen-law enforcement relations, and ultimately undermining the narratives of extremist groups and reducing recruitment and violence. The second one is that *if* civil society organisations are made aware of how law enforcement perceives and responds to violent extremism, including its willingness to cooperate, *then* this will contribute to mutual understanding of each other's roles and capacities *leading* to stronger and more cohesive efforts on CVE. This will happen *because* greater openness and willingness to collaborate translates into common objectives and improves mutual confidence and trust.

2.3.2   Result area 2 - Strengthening the Capacity of Women's Organisations to Fight Violent Extremism

The result area had the objective to *understand the role of women communities in Somaliland and Puntland, with a specific focus on exploring women's role in increasing community resilience to radicalisation and violent extremism.* An initial research phase, the *understand* element, led to pilot projects identified through the research in order to test assumptions and explore whether activities can make a meaningful contribution to the objective of this result area. The questions explored in the research phase concerned: the role of women in Puntland and Somaliland in community safety; the nature of

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[5] Building on an initiative originally supported by USAID OTI.

women's roles in understanding and influencing youth at risk of radicalisation and in building community resilience; and possible entry points for capacity building. Following the analysis, a number of workshops and trainings were conducted, including training for women on CVE, community meetings as well as meetings between the Somaliland police force and women.

The theory of change for this result area is based on the assumption that women have a role in understanding and addressing radicalisation and violent extremism in Somaliland and Puntland: *If* women, women's organisations and women's communities have increased capacity to identify and address radicalisation and violent extremism and *if* they support each other more and exchange approaches and good practice, *then* radicalisation risks can be more readily identified and addressed, *because* of women's special role and influence within communities and families.

2.3.3   Result area 3 – Increased understanding of the challenges faced by EU-born youth in Somaliland

The 2012 Formulation Study identified diaspora youth in Somaliland as a particularly vulnerable group due to the difficulties that they can experience integrating into the Somaliland community, including tensions with local youth. The theme was subsequently included in STRIVE's terms of reference and research explored youth diaspora issues in greater depth. Guided by this, the pilot has facilitated various diaspora/local integration activities (including youth clubs, dialogue, sports, and tourism) and has involved around 600 youth (circa 30% diaspora)

The theory of change here is that *if* efforts are made to promote a stronger integration and understanding of diaspora youth and better relations between them and local youth, *then* the risk that youth from both groups will be radicalised while in Somaliland will be reduced, *because* they feel less marginalised and isolated and their resilience will be strengthened through the mutual friendships and contacts made.

2.3.4   Result area 4 – Increased understanding of the drivers of radicalisation among youth in Kenya

This result area has included a number of pilot projects focusing on at risk groups amongst youth, particularly in slum areas of Nairobi and along the Kenya Coast.

The Mentorship pilot has built upon an existing project called "From the Grave to the Ground" and located in the Majengo area of Nairobi. This is a deprived area with a significant degree of urban youth marginalisation and is a recruiting ground for both criminal and violent extremist groups (such as al Shabaab). The pilot has involved 200+ beneficiaries (45% women), especially the 18-24 age group, of whom 20 have been identified by the project team as being on the path to radicalisation and 5 were assessed as presenting serious risks. The pilot has responded to the needs at an individual level through sustained mentoring, capacity development and support for alternative livelihoods. The theory of change here is that that *if* vulnerable youth are identified and brought together through a dialogue process that identifies and responds to their particular needs and conditions, *then* they will become more resilient to the narratives and incentives offered by extremist recruiters, *leading* to a reduction in extremist attitudes and behaviour, including recruitment. This will be possible *because* they learn how to resist the extremist rhetoric and develop viable and constructive alternatives to recruitment.

The Radio Salaam pilot has worked with a Mombasa-based radio station to produce radio feature stories, discussions and programmes on radicalization and recruitment in order to raise awareness,

stimulate debate and spread educated, positive voices of imams, clerics and *ukhtis*.[6] This included, for example, feature stories of families that had lost members through terrorist recruitment, as well as live discussions of topics relating to violent extremism by Islamic scholars. According to its own research (which was not received and could not be independently verified by the evaluation team) Radio Salaam reaches 700.000 listeners on average per day. The theory of change is that *if* well-researched radio programmes and features with educated authorities are aired and *if* the relevant target audiences listen to this, *then* this will stimulate a discussion around the topic in the public sphere, give moderate imams a louder voice, raise awareness and ultimately contribute to reducing radicalisation, *because* the topic is dealt with in a more informed way and discussed openly. This will also contribute to raising awareness among youth about the consequences of their actions for families and society as a whole.

The Alternative Voices pilot has worked with the Mombasa-branch of the Council of Imams and Preachers of Kenya (CIPK), cooperating mainly with imams and *ukhtis* considered as moderate and building their capacity to preach and engage youth and to spot early warning signs of radicalisation. CIPK, according to its own estimates, includes approximately 40% of imams and mosques across Kenya and more than 90% of mosques, imams, preachers and *ukhtis* in Mombasa. Activities here included research on CIPK's and moderate imams' influence, organization, the content of their sermons and whether and how they are able to reach youth at risk. The project has conducted pilot activities and contributed to sermon drafting, which has led to a preaching guide that has been pilot tested and is about to be published and distributed (end 2016). Mosque monitors were also trained and sent to mosques in order to systematically assess the quality and content of sermons and mosque attendance, and in order to monitor the project's impact. The theory of change is that *if* moderate imams and *ukhtis* strengthen their preaching skills and tailor them to the interests of youth and *if* both are better able to understand processes of individual radicalisation, *then* the group of their regular mosque attenders will increase, a good reputation of the mosque will spread, undecided youths will be inclined to attend moderate mosques instead of radical ones, *leading to* a decrease in the number of radicalisation processes in mosques, *because* youths will find the moderate preaching has increased in relevance to them.

The Inter-Faith Dialogue pilot has worked mainly with the Coast Interfaith Council of Clerics (CICC), a Mombasa-based network of religious organisations, including Christians and Muslims, with a deep reach into communities through their religious organisations and networks. The pilot has tested whether Muslim-Christian interfaith dialogue can contribute to CVE through interfaith meetings with religious leaders, youth and government officials. The theory of change is that *if* conflict drivers are better understood and *if* some or all of these identified conflict drivers are addressed through religious networks, communities and interaction with public authorities, *then* youth vulnerability will be reduced and fewer youths will be radicalised, *because* awareness has been raised, concrete solutions have been found and religious networks in hot spot communities empowered.

Research has taken place through the engagement of NKEs for various pilot activities, for conducting baseline research, for designing pilot projects and media engagement and for project monitoring. NKEs were also engaged for conducting activities such as training as well as the final evaluation. Because of the procedural restrictions in contracting companies or NGOs directly or to give local grant contracts, NKEs were used for a number of these activities.

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[6] The word *Ukhti* literally means "my sister" in Arabic and refers to learned women who fulfil a function similar to imams, but mainly to a female audience, i.e. providing religious, spiritual and personal guidance.

2.3.5 Communications

Communications aspects of CVE was originally not foreseen in project design and was not included in the project's budget. It was added later without any formal change to the terms of reference and a NKE on strategic communication was engaged mid-project to conduct a baseline research on the media landscape and CVE in Kenya, to establish contacts with Kenyan journalists on CVE and to develop an approach for the project as well as possible activities in this field. A number of articles were published that helped to raise the profile of the topic as well as STRIVE. The basic theory of change was that *if* Kenyan media report accurately on CVE and communicate positively on tolerance and co-existence, *then* awareness and visibility of the topic will be raised, *leading* to a more informed public discourse.

3   Methodology and approach to the evaluation

The evaluation team's methodology was provided in an Inception Report prior to the field mission and agreed with RUSI.[7] A mixed methods approach was used that combined desk study and document review followed by semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions (FGDs) with key stakeholders, beneficiaries and other experts. Interviews drew from an interview guide reflecting the key evaluation questions proposed in the evaluation's Terms of Reference. A list of documents reviewed is attached at annex E.

The two team members participated jointly in most interview sessions in order to provide maximum opportunity for commonality of approach and subsequent interaction regarding emerging findings. The team also used a division of labour so that each team member took lead responsibility for a particular result area/pilot. The findings were then discussed and agreed within the team prior to report writing. The team discussed project details and emerging findings with the STRIVE team and a debriefing prior to departure from Nairobi provided a further opportunity for feedback.

The Terms of Reference for the evaluation set out two overall objectives as well as a series of evaluation questions. The two objectives were:

a. *To assess each and every pilot activity in STRIVE (HoA) against the stated aims, purpose and objectives of the project and the wider EU programme;*
b. *To assess whether STRIVE (HoA) has met international standards and best practice in its design, delivery and implementation.*

In relation to (a), the evaluation team has included all of the pilot activities within the assessment in order to provide an overview of the scope of the STRIVE project as whole, the quantity and quality of the activities undertaken, the results and key lessons learned and emerging. In relation to the wider EU programme, the team has assessed the project's relevance to the EU Counter Terrorism Action Plan for the Horn of Africa and Yemen.[8]

In relation to (b), the team highlighted in its Inception Report the need to provide a realistic and achievable framework for assessing STRIVE against international standards given that best practice in the area is diffuse and still developing. Inter alia, this is also one of the objectives of the project to develop best practice. In order to keep this task manageable, the team has used the overall guidance provided by the United Nations Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism (2015) and relevant

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[7] STRIVE evaluation, Inception Report, 16 September 2016
[8] EU Counter Terrorism Action Plan for the Horn of Africa and Yemen, 31.8.2012

good practice papers emerging from the Global Counter Terrorism Forum (GCTF) as a basis against which to assess the thematic relevance of the project.[9] In relation to the former, paragraphs 51-54 of the Action Plan provide guidance relating to dialogue; governance, human rights and the rule of law; engaging communities; empowering youth; gender equality; and education, skills development and employment facilitation. In relation to the latter, examples include good practice papers on community policing and a multi-sectoral approach. While neither the UN nor GCTF are presented at a programmatic level, they nonetheless provide an accessible framework against which to assess STRIVE's implementation.

The evaluation has also been guided by the questions set out in the Evaluation Terms of Reference, which broadly correspond to the OECD/DAC evaluation criteria (i.e. relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, and impact). Sustainability was not included as a criterion given the pilot nature of the activities, although it could be argued that the *potential* for sustainability would have been a pertinent aspect to pursue. The team has therefore included observations on sustainability and exit where appropriate in this report. As part of the inception phase of the evaluation, the team prepared an evaluation matrix in order to help guide the semi-structured interviews. A copy of this is attached at Annex B and the evaluation questions are answered directly in Chapter 4 below.

The evaluation team notes that the STRIVE project has been designed as a series of individual pilot initiatives with objectives that include learning as well as results. In relation to learning, the process of developing, locating and delivering the pilots has provided a number of findings and, therefore, the degree to which STRIVE has been able to extract and disseminate these has been assessed by the team. With regard to results (and the other DAC criteria), the exploratory nature of the initiatives needs also to be emphasised and thus, while we have utilised the DAC criteria as guidance, their application is not as rigorous as it would have been if we had been assessing a more traditional development project. For instance, and as we note below, assessment of outcome and impact can be unrealistic in projects with only a short life span. The difficult operating environments, the sensitivity of VE and CVE, and the fact that knowledge about CVE is still developing are also factors that distinguish STRIVE (and this evaluation) from more traditional development projects and evaluation practices.

Underpinning its approach, the evaluation team has drawn from the understanding of CVE that is set out in the EC's recent brochure on strengthening resilience to violence and extremism.[10] Here, CVE *is understood to constitute all actions that strengthen the resilience of individuals and communities to the appeal of radicalisers and violent extremism, from inter-faith dialogues to vocational training, mentorship programmes, training of state governance and security actors, and community debates on sensitive topics.* CVE thus comprises *a broad range of non-coercive and preventative activities that are united by the objective of counteracting the key drivers of violent extremism specific to the locations in which the programmes are taking place …….[and] include activities that target individuals specifically identified as potentially "at risk" of being drawn to violence.[11]* As such, it forms part of the broader response to countering terrorism.

It is also understood that radicalisation takes place along a continuum and that radicalisation processes are individual and include a range of push, pull and enabling or facilitating factors. *Push factors* are the political, socio-economic and cultural conditions that favour the propagation of extremist ideologies and narratives. *Pull factors* are the personal rewards that embarking on an extremist cause may confer. These may include financial and other material benefits and social

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[9] www.thegctf.org/About-us/Key-GCTF-documents and www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/70/674
[10] STRIVE for Development: Strengthening Resilience to Violence and Extremism, EC, 2016
[11] ibid

status. *Enabling factors* relate to the radicalisation process and include social networks and the activities of motivators who groom potential recruits. It follows that a comprehensive approach to CVE needs to address in a holistic way the particular set of factors affecting the individual or group identified as being at risk.[12] Such programming will ideally have been informed by an analysis of VE risk factors, thus enabling it to be targeted. In the report, we note that certain STRIVE pilots appear more targeted than others in this regard.

4 Evaluation findings

This chapter provides the evaluation team's main findings. It is divided into a number of sections, each of them responding to a grouping of the evaluation questions organised broadly according to the DAC evaluation criteria. Lessons for good practice are included in each section where appropriate. The chapter ends with three sections that summarise key findings from each of the result areas as well as in relation to programme management, international best practice, and the contribution to learning.

4.1 Findings in relation to relevance

The evaluation ToR asked for an assessment of (a) whether the activities were consistent with the aims, purpose and objectives of the project? (b) Whether the activities were relevant to the problem of violent extremism in the HoA? And (c), given the changing context, was the amendment made to the project's terms of reference justifiable?

4.1.1 Consistency with aims, purpose and objectives of the project

The evaluation team finds that STRIVE's implementation has been relevant to the aims, purpose and objectives of the project as set out in the terms of reference. In particular, these ask that STRIVE "develop best practices to implement and monitor programmes that have demonstrable impact on strengthening resilience against extremism and violence in the Horn of Africa."[13] The pilot project modality used by STRIVE has provided considerable opportunity for learning and is assessed as relevant.

As set out in section 4.3.3 below, the team notes that a number of changes to the original terms of reference have been made. The project's relevance has been maintained through these changes.

The project's contextual relevance is also strong; the Horn of Africa region continues to host terrorist groups and has areas that include populations who are highly vulnerable to recruitment, particularly youth. The project has focused on localities in Kenya (Eastleigh and in the Coastal Region) that are particularly vulnerable, although there are also other hot spot areas, as well as Somalia (Somaliland and to a lesser extent Puntland).

In relation to policy, STRIVE is well-aligned with the EU Counter Terrorism Action Plan for the Horn of Africa and Yemen.[14] It responds directly to paragraph 4.6 of the Action Plan relating to countering violent extremism (community engagement, including youth, minorities, urban slums etc. diaspora, communications and knowledge). The evaluation team also finds that the pilot activities

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[12] Lessons learned from Danish and other international efforts on Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) in development contexts, Danida Evaluation Study, 2015. RUSI's publication *Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) and Risk Reduction* (2016) uses a similar typography.
[13] STRIVE ToR (IFS/2013/ 323-676), 2014. These objectives also feature in the revised LFA (six month report, August 2014).
[14] EU Counter Terrorism Action Plan for the Horn of Africa and Yemen, 31.8.2012

have been well-aligned to the priorities outlined in the UN Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism.[15] This aspect is further assessed in section 4.7 below.

4.1.2   Relevance to the problem of violent extremism

In relation to <u>Result Area 1</u> (law enforcement and civil society), the team find that the project is highly relevant given the perception that the actions of law enforcement agencies can be both part of the problem as well as part of the solution to countering radicalisation and violent extremism. The main Kenyan partner (the National Counter Terrorism Centre – NCTC) has increased in relevance with the clarification of its mandate as the anchor for the new national CVE strategy. The relevance of working with the NCTC will increase provided that the training curriculum and training (which are the main outputs so far) can be extended to reach front line officers (especially in hot spot areas) in addition to the mid-level management already trained and that institutional arrangements promoting cooperation amongst the various law enforcement agencies in Kenya are also in place to support it. In this respect, the pilot is well aligned to the newly adopted Kenyan CVE strategy. The team notes that it will also be important to maintain coherency with other donors' activities in this area, notably that of the Danish police intelligence service (PET) and UNODC.

With regard to civil society, STRIVE has supported a civil society coordination initiative, anchored in the Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims (SUPKEM), and aligned to a national NGO charter on CVE advocacy and accountability. The team finds this contextually relevant as it included a range of stakeholders. The pilot's modality (involving law enforcement and civil society actors in each other's trainings and events) is also regarded as highly relevant given the mistrust that can exist between the two groups of actors.

In relation to <u>Result Area 2</u> (women as CVE actors), the team finds that the pilots in Somaliland (and Puntland to the extent that they were carried out) have been useful in testing whether and what kind of CVE-related activities can be conducted in these two regions. In Somaliland, the evaluation team found that CVE is considered as a very sensitive topic and that the government and many people are not comfortable with discussing it, neither between themselves nor with externals, and therefore treat it as a taboo. The pilot has therefore explored whether women can act as an entry point for engagement on CVE, even if it wasn't phrased like this in the STRIVE documentation. The team find that this has been a relevant line of enquiry.

Measured against its own logic, the project's main achievement is awareness raising and an increased presence of female police officers in police stations, which makes it more likely for women to go to police stations and report crimes. This is relevant as it reduces the distrust between the population and the police, one possible conflict driver. The team find that spelling out a theory of change could have helped the project to clarify and test assumptions and intended results. Such an approach could have increased the relevance of pilot activities, for example through providing greater clarity on the steps that women can realistically take if they succeed in identifying potential cases of radicalisation.

In relation to <u>Result Area 3</u> (diaspora youth in Somaliland), the team finds that it was relevant to undertake further research on the role of diaspora vis à vis local youth. While different studies lead to different conclusions on the topic, the research commissioned by STRIVE found very little evidence of diaspora youth engaging in violent extremism in Somaliland or of having been radicalised during their stay. Instead, most informants to that research were of the opinion that radicalisation of youth was taking place in Europe, often through the internet. This finding is also

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[15] www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/70/674

supported by the practice that most diaspora youth spend only a relatively short period in Somaliland (during summer holidays); although older, unaccompanied youth may stay for longer. The STRIVE-commissioned research thus found that it is the latter group that would benefit most from integration assistance as part of CVE programming.[16] In this respect, the timing of project activities (outside of the school holidays) has helped increase relevance as it enabled a relatively higher participation of people from this group to be involved.

On the other hand, the team observes that the pilot activities most directly relevant to violent extremism (such as the Islamic dialogue fora) do not appear to have been successful because of the unwillingness of the Sheikhs invited to take up the issue of extremism.[17] The inability to tackle VE directly from Islamic sources is unfortunate as the youth participants (both local and diaspora) were interested to hear about the issue. The team finds that other aspects of the pilot (excursions, sports) appear less directly relevant from a CVE objective due to the individuals involved (being not in the "at risk" category) and the questionable capacity of the local implementer to manage or refer potentially radicalised youth should they have been identified. The pilot thus also demonstrates the difficulty of undertaking CVE in a context like Somaliland where local actors lack capacity and where gaining traction on the issue is challenging because of local taboos.

In relation to Result Area 4, the team finds a high degree of relevance amongst certain of the pilots (especially mentoring, alternative voices and preventative communications) where these are closely targeting distinct groups that are at risk (especially vulnerable youth). In the case of the mentoring pilot, the relevance is increased through the methodology used (whereby radicalised youth were identified and involved in the pilot). The sermon guidelines (CIPK) is less targeted because the audience will be quite broad but it remains relevant as it seeks to increase the convening power of moderate imams and reduce the attraction of more radical preachers. In the same manner, Radio Salaam is also less targeted (relying upon attracting an audience). However, it tackles issues of radicalisation directly and through a number of different approaches (news, features, and call-ins), which are relevant. The team found that the inter-faith dialogue activities (CICC) were also relevant to learning but impact relevance (of activities promoting tolerance, civil responsibility and interaction with duty bearers) could have been increased with a greater focus on at-risk groups.

Adding communication to the STRIVE work was relevant and is a good example of learning and adaptation, as communication relating to CVE is a relevant topic that could and should have been included from the beginning. The engagement of a NKE mid-project to conduct a baseline research on the media landscape and CVE in Kenya, to develop cooperation with Kenyan journalists on CVE, and to develop an approach for the project as well as possible activities in this field was a very relevant addition. The media reports that followed helped to raise awareness on CVE, as well as the visibility of STRIVE. Especially after violent events, it helped to present more balanced, moderate and nuanced reporting on those events, stressing coexistence and thus countering the narrative of extremists and less balanced, less-informed but widespread media reporting. The interest of Kenyan media in the topic and the willingness to cooperate with STRIVE was high. Journalists at this point were looking for easy access to stories around CVE and radicalisation and STRIVE was in a good position to respond to those needs.

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[16] Somaliland Youth Education: Mapping education and socio-cultural trends, Laurence Hargreaves and Naji Abou Khalil, July 2014

[17] Project final report, SONYO, 10 August 2016

4.1.3   Relevance of amendments made to the Terms of Reference

The evaluation team understands that STRIVE has evolved slightly from the design envisaged in the original Terms of Reference, the net effect being to more strongly focus on activities in Kenya (Nairobi and the Coastal Region) and Somaliland. In particular, it was decided:

- Not to pursue activities in Ethiopia.
- To curtail activities in Puntland (result area 2) due to concerns about security and capacity, although some initial research activities were undertaken.
- Not to engage in South Central Somalia, although STRIVE indicated its willingness to undertake a study on drivers of radicalisation (initial request from EU Delegation).
- Not to pursue the education pilot in Eastleigh (Nairobi) as this was regarded as overly ambitious given the resources available.
- To include a communications element.

The team understands that these adjustments were discussed with the EU on a needs basis and included in the regular six-monthly reporting. With regard to relevance, the team notes that the original geographical focus of STRIVE has remained relevant from a CVE perspective. Given the resources available within the STRIVE team and taking into account practical and duty of care issues, we find the adjustments to be sensible and relevant. Moreover, there are important lessons here concerning the conditions that are ripe for CVE and the approaches that are possible. Kenya, and to a lesser extent Somaliland, are relatively permissive environments in that the authorities allow external actors to undertake a variety of CVE activities (i.e. not only agency to agency cooperation and/or support to security actors). The net effect has been to increase the focus of STRIVE.

4.2   Findings in relation to effectiveness

STRIVE was explicitly set up as a pilot project in order to learn and generate lessons for what works in CVE. In this section, we provide an assessment of how the project was arranged to achieve effectiveness in these areas. Findings in relation to the actual results achieved are set out in section 4.4.

Pilot approaches in STRIVE's four Result Areas were supposed to test different assumptions and approaches, based on solid baseline research, in order to draw conclusions for what produces results, based on strong evidence. For each pilot, the project would normally go through the following steps:

1. Project idea, normally emanating from Formulation Study, discussions with the EU and within the STRIVE project team
2. Baseline research, usually conducted by a NKE
3. Project implementation, accompanied by monitoring
4. Final evaluation, learning and conclusions about the pilot.

Idea → Baseline study → Implementation → Evaluation and Learning

Monitoring

The findings of document research were confirmed by interviews that these steps were generally followed. STRIVE has drawn from the 2012 Formulation Study in identifying its pilot areas and its intervention modalities. This has been supplemented by a research phase that has confirmed the overall relevance of the pilot and contributed to its design and delivery. Given the sensitivity of CVE and the complex and volatile context, the research phase is considered a highly relevant aspect of the project and a good practice (through helping to ensure that the pilots have taken due regard to the local context in which they are located). The research has contributed to an understanding also of the actors available to take roles in implementation, although the team would highlight that this has often involved a compromise between numerous factors, such as actor availability, neutrality and local credibility, technical capacity, convening power, and reach. STRIVE has found that there is a relatively greater selection of potential partners in Kenya than in neighbouring countries. In Somaliland, the choice of implementing partners has been limited and this has had an impact on the effectiveness of the pilots located there.

An important part of the learning has come from the steps involved in setting up the pilots; for example, in engaging with women in Somaliland and Puntland and with youth in Somaliland and Kenya. In this sense, the team notes that process activities have also had the character of results and a number of useful findings have emerged. These include the importance of locating pilots firmly with local community structures (so they are not regarded as alien and thereby rejected). Similarly, working with respected and credible actors (the mentoring pilot and also CIPK, for example) has provided access and a mechanism for project delivery. The inclusive and participatory approach taken by STRIVE (in all pilots) has also been very relevant and is likely to have contributed to effectiveness. STRIVE's project team that has included technical expertise in key positions (including Non-Key Experts contracted into the project) has also contributed to a management set up that has been able to engage with local actors and implementing partners on a peer level, which has been useful. With regard to cooperation with state security agencies (i.e. the NCTC), the experience demonstrates the relevance of establishing a formal agreement (e.g. an MOU) to govern the arrangement and mutual understandings and commitments.[18]

If "piloting" is also understood as trying out innovative, new approaches and not only testing existing approaches, the evaluation team finds that the degree of innovation involved has varied. In Somaliland, we see that the work with women has been innovative (engagement of women through peace committees, involvement of local clan structures as a pre-requisite for local acceptance etc.). But elsewhere, STRIVE has generally supported activities that were already on the way (i.e. previously funded by other donors) or developed before and independent of STRIVE's support. In these cases, STRIVE supported a process of continuation and adaptation rather than starting new processes. Examples include CIPK, and CICC in Kenya and SONYO in Somaliland (which all are also supported by various other donors in similar fields). The successful mentoring project in Eastleigh, Nairobi was also an initiative that was underway before STRIVE came on the scene. Even so, the evaluation team finds that the projects have provided good opportunities for learning. STRIVE's regular reporting, occasional papers, and the regular participation of the team leader in learning events have been the key means for dissemination in this regard.

The team has also considered what could have been done better and increased STRIVE's ability to learn? A key finding here is that learning requires a robust approach to integrating monitoring and evaluation into project design and delivery (e.g. through clear baselines and

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[18] Although STRIVE did not initially have an agreement with NCTC, one was established during its first year.

assumptions) to provide a basis for assessing change and to allow for a final conclusion whether a certain CVE approach works or not, what the pre-conditions for change might be, potential risks, and therefore whether and how the findings might be replicated and rolled-out or not. The team appreciates that baseline and endline perception surveys are likely to be expensive but they nonetheless present a potentially useful option for monitoring change.

Linked to this, the evaluation team finds that spelling out <u>theories of change</u> in the idea, design and baseline stage of each pilot project will strengthen the scope for learning and results. Interviews during the evaluation revealed that implicit theories of change were behind each of the pilot projects, but they were not written down, spelt out and developed. The team finds that this has limited the learning experience because assumptions have not always been identified and tested (although it is acknowledged that the low capacities and experience of some of the implementing partners was also a factor). The effect has also been to limit buy-in from stakeholders compared to a process that would have used a theory of change approach as a deliberate part of project design. Such an approach would have asked explicitly questions such as "why, if we do this, do we think the following change will result?" or "what conditions are necessary to produce the desired change?" And the answers could have been fed into the project's monitoring framework.

A further aspect of effectiveness concerns the approach taken to assessing and managing risk. Here the team finds that, although macro level risks were specifically highlighted (e.g. all STRIVE reporting included an updated threat assessment and information on drivers of radicalisation), there was a less obvious focus on risk at project level. The team finds that the quality of the project risk assessments and risk management plans (i.e. the risks of not being able to learn or not being able to achieve outcomes), as a whole and also for the individual pilots has been generally rather weak. Operating in a sensitive field, STRIVE could have been expected to systematically assess risks for security of staff, programmatic risks as well as reputational risks for STRIVE, RUSI and the EU. This did not take place in a systematic way, or in sufficient depth, in most pilot projects or at least wasn't captured in writing. The team would also like to recommend that Do-No-Harm aspects of activities be more explicitly assessed so that possible unintended impacts can be identified; for example, the risk that mentors, moderate imams and monitors could themselves be targeted by al Shabaab in response to their CVE-related activities.

The evaluation team notes that STRIVE was not asked to and has not adopted a *programmatic* approach, being instead a number of stand-alone pilot projects, each with its own internal logic. Nonetheless, the team believe that it would be useful to expose some of the implications of this so that future CVE piloting can learn from it. Adopting a programmatic approach where feasible would, for example, make it possible to utilise synergies and interaction between the pilots or with other CVE related activities being pursued by other actors. This could perhaps beuseful for the pilots located on the Kenya coast and in Somaliland, which share a number of contextual features. On the Kenya coast, some of the STRIVE partners are also supported by other donors and the possibilities for useful synergies could have been exploited more directly. STRIVE's outreach activities provided some scope for this but the extent to which possibilities were actually taken up is unclear.

In a similar vein, the team would also like to highlight that the pilot nature of STRIVE has meant that, in most cases, little attention has been paid to sustainability issues and, that even with the constraints that piloting involves (such as limited funding, short term objectives), there can be value in deliberately assessing the implications of exit and scope for extension. In terms of exit, the team finds this potentially problematic where pilots have started processes and raised expectations only to

leave them at the end of the pilot period. The effects of such exits should be considered from a do-no-harm perspective. That said, the team is also aware that some pilots have continued under the STRIVE II project or with support from other donors (the mentoring pilot and the civil society CVE platforms are examples).

4.3   Findings in relation to efficiency

The main evaluation question related to efficiency is whether the results could have been achieved with fewer or other means. Overall, the findings of document research were confirmed by interviews that STRIVE has been efficient and, with a very lean core project team, it has managed and overseen a wide variety of pilot projects as well as deliver visibility and learning.

Interviewees stressed that STRIVE is working in a challenging environment and with limited financial and human resources. As already noted, the level of professionalization (e.g. of possible partners and civil society organisations with capacity in delivering CVE) is often rather limited, so the project had to choose between either building up CVE capacity of selected CSOs and/or working with those CSOs that were present already. The lack of capacity and experience with the topic is particularly the case in Somaliland and Puntland. These factors, which are beyond the influence of the project, need to be taken into account when judging the project's efficiency. It also needs to be taken into account that STRIVE has had a relatively small budget and has had to use external NKEs for activities. Sourcing and managing the latter can present a problem for efficiency.

In general, both project documentation and the evaluation team find that pilot activities were implemented more efficiently where they were closely accompanied by either STRIVE project staff or an NKE and where the setup allowed both support to the implementer as well as supervision. This applies for example to the activities in Mombasa and the coastal region, where a NKE was regularly present. It also applies to the work in Nairobi (e.g. with NCTC), which could be regularly visited by project staff. However, when projects had to be implemented remotely (e.g. in Somaliland), project implementation was less efficient. Implementers were only visited by STRIVE project staff once every month or every second month and communication and project management often had to rely on emails. This did not always give the STRIVE team full visibility of progress or allow it to intervene where things could have been organised differently, e.g. with the selection of participants and facilitators for the SONYO youth dialogue work in Somaliland.

The team note that the changes to the project scope (see section 4.3.3) will have had a positive effect on efficiency as they have enabled the STRIVE team to concentrate on fewer pilots and project locations. In this sense, the original project design had been overly ambitious in relation to the staffing foreseen. A lesson here is to ensure that the scope of the project matches the financial and human resources available.

The team also note that the lean management set up has also concentrated knowledge in the hands of the STRIVE team leader. On the one hand, this has helped efficiency because the team leader has maintained a good overview of project activities and contacts. On the other, it risks stressing the project where the team leader also takes a significant role in disseminating knowledge and learning (e.g. through visits and appearances at international events and seminars on CVE) and is thus absent.

4.4   Findings in relation to results

The evaluation Terms of Reference asked the team to consider (a) what, so far, has been the outcome of the activities? (b) What, so far, has been the impact of the project?

4.4.1 Assessment of project outputs, outcomes and impact

The team's use of the terms outcomes and impact is based upon the OECD/DAC definitions. According to this, *outcomes* are the short and medium term effects (changes) that arise as a consequence of a project output, a project *output* being a product of the intervention concerned. *Impacts* are the positive and negative, primary and secondary long-term effects produced by a development intervention, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended.[19]

The team notes that the short term nature of the STRIVE pilots (in general less than six months) has had implications for the achievement of outcomes and impact as such changes/effects often require a longer and more sustained intervention. Furthermore, assessment of impact is often challenged by the effects of other factors, including other processes within society, which may have effects on the target group. This makes *attribution* of impact difficult. In short, it will be difficult to say whether changes are the consequence of the intervention alone or whether they are the effect of a combination of factors. In the latter case, it may be more accurate to say that the intervention has made a *contribution* to wider changes.

In relation to <u>Result Area 1</u>, there has been a significant output in the form of the CVE training curriculum and its delivery in two pilot trainings (involving around 60 individuals from a variety of law enforcement agencies). NCTC and STRIVE note that these have led to positive attitude changes amongst participants. It is understood that the next phase of the project will extend these outputs to reach a large number of middle and lower rank law enforcement personnel, including at county level. With regard to civil society, STRIVE's support to civil society coordination led to some county-based consultative fora, which brought together civil society and law enforcement at the county level, including women and youth. Civil society representatives have also been involved in the curriculum development and delivery. Likewise, law enforcement representatives have been present at meetings of the civil society fora.

The team regard these as significant achievements for a non-state actor (RUSI) given the sensitive nature of the thematic environment and the large number of security actors present in Kenya. STRIVE has succeeded in gaining buy-in from the Kenyan Government as well as civil society representatives at both a political and a practical level and this has added to the quality of the products and their longer term sustainability.

In relation to <u>Result Area 2</u>, STRIVE's main output includes conducting a number of pilot activities with women, police officers and communities in Somaliland, implemented in cooperation with and through the NGO United Trust Associations (UNITA). The main results, according to UNITA reports and additional monitoring, include the increased capacity of community committees and women groups to understand CVE, as well as training cascaded from women peace committees to more than 1000 community leaders, elders, women and youth. In Puntland, initial research was conducted that produced baseline information for possible future engagement. Possible outcomes and impact of these activities are, however, less clear and would need further examination amongst the communities concerned.

In relation to <u>Result Area 3</u>, outputs include the initial research report on EU-born Somaliland youth. This helped expand the knowledge of this stakeholder group as well as of the difficulties being experienced by local youth. Following the research, activities were developed targeting these two groups through fora for diaspora and youth, exposure to Islamic teaching, sports events, and

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[19] OECD/DAC Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results-Based Management 2002

exposure visits. These activities were designed to develop awareness, tolerance, critical thinking and engagement between the two groups. The pilot was able to engage a total of 600 youth (25% diaspora), although there does not appear to have been any distinct targeting of youth vulnerable to radicalisation.[20] After initially trying to be more targeted in the selection of youth, which did not work, the pilot felt pushed to use a broad brush approach instead and has engaged with the local and diaspora youth it could attract.

In relation to Result Area 4, the mentoring pilot has worked directly with around 100 youth in a key hot spot area and where around 10% of the mentees have been assessed as being highly vulnerable and already in the process of being radicalised. While it is not possible for the team to reach a conclusion regarding the sustainability of the mentorship project's results, the project manager and the former mentees consulted by the team highlighted participation, uptake of offers of alternative livelihoods and (positive) changes in attitude and behaviour amongst mentees as outcomes and these suggest also the possibility of impact. In addition, it appears that a small number of former mentees now also have roles as mentors (which is also an outcome).

The outcomes are less obvious in relation to the other two pilots mentioned above, although there is anecdotal evidence that the trials of the sermon guide have resulted in increased congregations in the mosques concerned (an effect of the sermons being seen as more relevant and attractive to youth). Monitoring of the testing phase has reportedly shown that the sermon guide has helped to reduce communication barriers between imams and their congregations and has improved the capacities of some mosque management committees. The trainings to improve sermon skills led to an increase of mosque attenders of trained imams and *ukhtis*. The sermon guide is a significant output of this pilot and it will be valuable to monitor and assess its use in practice and possible changes in the attitudes.

Monitoring of the Radio Salaam pilots' broadcasts concerning radicalisation and violent extremism and the number of callers indicate that its audience of 700.000 listeners per day across Kenya has found the broadcasts worth listening to (i.e. output relevance). The two-fold approach, 1) a religious angle, engaging religious scholars to talk about religious and political issues, as well as 2) a secular angle, addressing violent extremism as it happens globally, looking at it from a family, value and moral and educational lens is also seen as positive. The evaluation team was informed that feature stories (e.g. about families of youth that joined al Shabaab) led to substantial discussions and feedback. Anecdotal evidence suggests that a formally key radical imam changed sides and went on the radio programme and spoke to youth directly, speaking against radicalisation. This was important given the person's status. Reactions from callers also showed that there had been uptake from the feature programmes.

As for the inter-faith pilot, outcomes and impact are less visible and convincing from a CVE perspective. The initial baseline research has led to a solid understanding and mapping of conflict-drivers in the coastal region though not specifically CVE-focused. Awareness about the topic has been raised among participants and in some of the communities through the religious clergy. STRIVE has, however, gained access to a relevant network of religious organisations in a target region that could be used for future work on CVE.

In relation to preventative communication, the evaluation team was only able to interview the NKE that supported STRIVE in developing a media strategy and made contacts with Kenyan journalists

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[20] Project final report, SONYO

available. He produced a baseline assessment mid-project. Through this cooperation, a number of articles and interviews were published in relevant Kenyan newspapers, which are likely to have contributed to raising the awareness and visibility of the CVE issue and the STRIVE project. The evaluation team was not able to verify this independently or from other sources though. According to the NKE, STRIVE provided support to journalists at the right time and when they started writing about the topic without much prior experience, which improved the quality of reporting. This was clearly of added value. By now, however, journalists have built up their own expertise and networks for reporting on the topic and STRIVE wouldn't be required to engage further.

4.5   Summary of findings from each of the results areas
The evaluation ToR asked the team to identify key findings from each of the result areas. The following sections provide a summary of observations and lessons in addition to the findings already presented.

4.5.1   Result Area 1 – Law enforcement and civil society
The pilot has produced a number of relevant lessons. Given the often negative perceptions of law enforcement in deprived areas of Kenya (which is also a feature of extremists' narrative), it appears crucial that both performance and transparency improve. This requires both changes at individual level and within the institutions and agencies involved in law enforcement, of which there are a considerable number in Kenya. A realistic aim would be to focus first on law enforcement operating in hot spots.

A key observation is that law enforcement and civil society can work together on a shared agenda and that it has been useful to have this facilitated externally (at least to kick it off). This is another example of the participatory approach used to promote trust in the project. Civil society actors were invited to contribute to the NCTC training and, likewise, law enforcement officers participated in civil society sensitisation events. In interviews with the team, both sides reported that they regarded these efforts as relevant although its effect is difficult to assess given that contacts (and thereby trust) are often individualised

A further key observation is future outcomes and possible impact in this area will depend upon the ability of the NCTC to engage with operational law enforcement agencies (including front line police) and embed CVE training in the various training institutions. It will be important that the right profile of personnel participate in training, that they are employed in relevant areas following the training, that they are able to utilise the skills learnt and that these efforts are supported institutionally. In relation to the skills concerned, a key outcome indicator will be behavioural change and not only the degree to which front line police and other law enforcement officials operating in communities are better equipped to interact with civil society and local communities. NCTC noted that a one week (five day) course is not sufficient; although it provides opportunities for sensitisation, the scope for deeper learning is limited. In particular, STRIVE's use of role-play was praised as it enabled those participating to relate to alternative perspectives. The team finds that this would be a challenge for an e-learning approach if this is used to reach a wider audience. A further lesson is that training should include middle as well as junior and front line personnel (especially in hot spot areas) so that the understanding of CVE is institutionalised and spread out to those that need it.

The team note that, in order to monitor improvements, a clear baseline and relevant indicators are required. Currently, police training is monitored through pre- and post-training questionnaires as well as follow up interviews with participants and their supervisors. The team do not regard this as

sufficient. Monitoring should ideally also capture perceptions of police performance (i.e. behavioural change) from citizens in the locations where trained officers are located.

Finally, the evaluation team would also highlight the importance of ensuring overall coherence in this area given that there is some donor crowding. It is important that STRIVE links up to and is aligned with other initiatives, such as that provided by Denmark (to NCTC) and UNODC (to prisons), and that a dialogue is held with a wider group of stakeholders (within the law enforcement area in Kenya and amongst donors and civil society) about how to promote broader institutional change and thus cement STRIVE's achievements. This should also relate to the new National CVE Strategy.

4.5.2 Result Area 2 – Role of women

The activities under Result Area 2 focused on Somaliland (UNITA) and Puntland (PRCD), but the evaluation team was only able to visit Somaliland and gain insight into the work with UNITA.

STRIVE's work in Puntland focused on research and a baseline assessment for the role of women in peacebuilding and CVE. The report available to the evaluation team is not finalised, but did not immediately identify follow-on activities. The team also understands that the activities in Puntland were halted due to security and capacity concerns. Results in Puntland are for that reason very limited.

In Somaliland, the work with the local partner (UNITA) has been based on a solid methodology and a baseline assessment process and report, written by a capable NKE; an open-ended research process led to recommendations and follow-on activities with women in different Somaliland communities. The baseline research also produced a useful mapping of who is doing what on CVE in Somaliland. The approach (engagement of women through women's peace committees, including in IDP camps and training of women police officers) was therefore innovative and has achieved outputs (capacity building and dialogue) and some outcomes (sensitising women, empowering people to raise religious questions). The work with female police officers improved the conditions at police stations according to female perceptions and makes it more likely that women will go there. Nonetheless, the team finds that further results under this pilot will ultimately also depend upon uptake of the capacity building and the ability of family members (particularly women) to recognise radicalisation indicators and take appropriate action (including referral). The team is unclear whether these conditions are in place and they should therefore be a subject for further assessment with the groups concerned. The team also note that there are significant cultural barriers that need to be overcome in these regards, although the pilot has identified them and sought to tackle them (see below).

The pilot has contributed to learning on the possibilities for engaging with women on CVE in Somaliland. This includes the substantial challenges facing work on CVE in Somaliland, the biggest one being the difficulty to discuss radicalisation and extremism openly with government, religious leaders and within society. It is considered as a taboo, as it goes against the common narrative that Somaliland and Hargeisa are more stable than Mogadishu and the rest of the country. According to people consulted by the team, clan leaders and religious leaders regularly refuse to address the topic at all – and this was also a finding from the work with youth (see below), which has attempted to generate a dialogue on the issue. Added to this, is the cultural understanding that women do not openly participate in security discussions. CVE programmes involving women therefore need to be highly culturally sensitive. The pilot found that one way of easing this was to ensure that clan/village leaders were involved in planning and conducting events. This requires a preceding sensitisation

process and awareness that there will be resistance to perceptions of external agendas (including CVE and gender equality).[21]

Finally, the team find that the lack of a permanent local presence in Somaliland has complicated management and oversight of activities through the STRIVE team. Not being permanently present in Hargeisa, the Project Advisor came once every month or every two months, which was not sufficient; there should have been a local contact more regularly involved.

4.5.3   Result Area 3 – Role of youth

The team finds that a stronger focus on the findings of the baseline study on diaspora youth could have helped improve targeting and that development of an explicit theory of change in the project design phase would have exposed the project's assumptions and the weaknesses mentioned above. Despite the attachment of a NKE to the project, there appears to have been only limited monitoring of the possible CVE impact of the pilot (inter alia, the design of the pilot did not include CVE indicators). The pilot also shows the importance of the correct choice of implementing partner – as well as the difficulty of this where capacity and choice of partners is limited. In the event, SONYO does not appear to have had any particular CVE expertise (although they are aware of the issue), and this raises the fundamental question of how they would have managed if the group of youth involved had included persons already on the path to radicalisation? While some external monitoring was managed by the NKE as well as a Project Advisor who came once every month or every two months, this does not appear to have been sufficient; there should have been a local contact more regularly involved (as was originally the plan from STRIVE's side).

This pilot confirmed the importance of understanding the local culture (and taboos) and use of local partners with credibility and access. Inter alia, it was found that the potential for positive messaging through dialogue (while utilised to some extent) was difficult to exploit fully due to the difficulty of engaging imams in dialogue on violent extremism, while secular facilitators lack the moral authority to discuss religious issues. Even when directly questioned by youth on extremism and terrorist groups such as al Shabaab and Islamic State, imams reportedly side-stepped the issue. The potential discussion on extremism therefore tended to get buried in general peace-building language (tolerance, co-existence), which would not have been adequate for a radicalised audience, if indeed it was raised at all. The difficulty of raising violent extremism issues in a Muslim majority community (as opposed to a mixed community) was one of the key findings of the pilot and enables STRIVE (or other interventions) to build upon the experience and possibly be more targeted despite the difficulty to address the topic. The pilot also shows the significant variation that occurs between localities. While STRIVE had difficulty getting the issue raised in Somaliland due to the reluctance of religious figures to stand out, in Kenya there was more willingness to do so and other approaches were used (e.g. the Radio Salam pilot and the sermon guide – RA 4) and appear to have gained more traction.

4.5.4   Result Area 4 – Other pilot projects

In relation to the mentorship pilot, the evaluation team found significant CVE relevance and capacity through a team of active and credible civil society mentors, well aware of local issues and vulnerabilities. This robust local capacity appears as a crucial factor as mentorship will otherwise lack the convening power necessary to gather local youth together and discuss sensitive issues openly. A further critical lesson is that the mentors respond to the mentees' needs as a counterweight to the tactics also used by extremist recruiters (which are often highly individualised).

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[21] Thirty-Month Report, STRIVE, 20 July 2016

Interviewees highlighted that successful mentorship requires a multi-track and tailored process, sustained over time, with the use of positive role models and positive alternatives (incentives) that relate to the individual's vulnerabilities. The pilot has sought to understand where on the radicalisation continuum the individual is placed and what the particular set of factors involved are. From this, an individual "case" is developed and applied. A key lesson learned is that trust needs to be established between the mentor and the mentee. This takes time and requires the right personality and skills set. It also appears important that the mentoring team includes people who can respond to relevant thematic issues, particularly concerning interpretations of religious doctrine and extremist messaging. A final, important, finding is that the mentorship process should lead to realistic alternatives for the mentee that are relevant within the community where he/she is located.

This pilot has centred on a person who is well known in the locality and respected (i.e. with good convening and facilitation skills), with a solid understanding of local issues and the radicalisation process, and able to provide continuity of input. The team see that this is a factor in its success and that, for the model to be replicated elsewhere, similar leadership figures will be required. The team would also highlight the significant programmatic, institutional and personal risks associated with this pilot that require greater attention in the project documentation through a risk analysis, listing all possible risks, their severity and possible mitigation measures. The project should consciously work within a Do No Harm approach that is aware of intended and unintended consequences of project activities. One way of doing this would be through conducting and regularly updating a project-level context analysis that reflects on on-going and planned activities, possibly involving some trusted project partners.

In relation to the interfaith pilot, the findings of document research were confirmed by interviews that the cooperation with CICC and the initial baseline research on peace, conflict and interfaith issues revealed many relevant conflict drivers in the coastal region, such as a lack of university education opportunities, a weak infrastructure, lack of employment opportunities, problems with land titles as well as identity issues. All of this led to a solid understanding of peace and conflict drivers in the region and opened an opportunity for further engagement. "Desperate, marginalised youth" was the main issue identified and to be addressed through follow-on work. A Youth Platform was created as a response, with the idea of seriously including youth positions and interests into political decision-making and dialogue. The team see this as relevant to addressing underlying concerns in the Coastal region but the pilot activities was not specifically targeted on individuals at risk (and it might have had difficulty attracting them anyway).

In relation to the alternative voices pilot, the evaluation finds that STRIVE selected a convincing implementing partner, the Mombasa chapter of the Council of Imams and Preachers of Kenya (CIPK), a faith-based organisation, as it represents approximately 40% of all mosques and preachers across Kenya and nearly all mosques and preachers in Mombasa (except for 5-10%) and therefore has a large outreach and access to the audience relevant for STRIVE. The pilot concentrated mainly on understanding drivers of radicalisation, enhancing the capacities of moderate imams to understand radicalisation and to improve their preaching skills, including for *ukhtis;* and on developing a sermon guide for all CIPK imams across Kenya. Especially the sermon guide is considered as a good result. In relation to the monitoring process, the team finds that monitors are potentially exposed to personal risks where they do not themselves belong to the mosque being monitored (i.e. their presence will be noticed) and that, unless there is a clear baseline, it will be difficult for them to accurately assess change.

In relation to the Radio Salam pilot, the findings of document research were confirmed by interviews that the project has contributed to raising awareness and triggering debates in the public and private sphere about violent extremism and radicalisation. Programmes focused on consequences of recruitment and highlighted community support for victims of terror, encouraging families to be aware and youth to consider consequences of their action. While it is obvious that radio programmes cannot prevent radicalisation alone, they can contribute to doing so though exposing listeners to alternative viewpoints, knowledge dissemination, checking of facts and more positive messaging. The monitoring processes built into the project (e.g. Focus Group Discussions interviewing audiences) allow some conclusions in this regard but should ideally be supplemented through broader perception surveys, if the project budget allows.

In relation to research, STRIVE demonstrates the need for a strong linkage between research findings, project design, implementation and monitoring. The findings of document research was confirmed by interviews that the priority attached to research is highly relevant to STRIVE's objective of identifying good practice. However, its value depends upon the degree to which pilot project design has drawn from the research findings and the team finds that the degree to which this has happened has varied. For example, the research undertaken on women's role in Somaliland highlighted both the lack of knowledge amongst communities about the indicators of at-risk individuals and the limited leverage of women in the patriarchal society, especially beyond the confines of the family.[22] While this first finding supports the pilot's focus on capacity building (output), the second presents a more fundamental and deep-rooted challenge that would need to be overcome for the capacity building to have actual utility (outcome). The team's findings in relation to results (section 4.6) cast doubt on whether this has been the case. A similar problem is identified concerning the pilot on youth diaspora in Somaliland where the baseline research questions the assumption that diaspora youth are at significant risk of being radicalised while in the country. This seems a highly relevant finding, although the pilot continued to focus on this stakeholder group and the outcomes of its activities appear limited (at least relating to CVE).

4.6   Findings in relation to project management

The STRIVE team, especially the Team Leader, is regarded as very capable and positive by many interviewees. At the same time, the team has faced high, demanding and diverse expectations, including: conducting pilot projects in various locations and countries, including Nairobi, Mombasa, Puntland, Somaliland, South-Central Somalia, and Ethiopia; informing and supporting the EU Delegation in Nairobi about developments in CVE research and practice and, likewise, feeding into the EU Commission in Brussels; informing global CVE developments; and setting up a project office and developing project management capacities for RUSI. The evaluation team finds that there is a substantial mismatch between these expectations and the number of staff positions made available for that purpose and STRIVE.

The evaluation team also find that the limited number of core team positions had implications for the degree and regularity of engagement with implementing partners, especially for activities in Somaliland. The limited scope for visits was not sufficient to provide the weaker implementing partners with adequate support in the day-to-day work, nor did it allow the level of oversight and quality control that is appropriate when implementing pilot projects in such sensitive and new sectors. In the light of this, the decisions taken early in the project to reduce its geographic scope are considered highly justified.

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[22] Study on the role of women in countering violent extremism and mapping of women's organisations as potential partners for CVE activities in Somaliland, Ifrah Mohamed, September 2014

The use of NKEs is generally seen as appropriate by the evaluation team. All those consulted appeared well informed and capable. Most of them were from the East Africa region (with the exception of the communication expert and the expert used in cooperation with the NCTC (RA 1). They had relevant language skills and access to the target audience. However, in some cases the project could have benefitted from a more constant engagement of the NKEs (for example, in the alternative voices pilot and in Somaliland and Puntland).

The evaluation team finds that in many cases, clearer and more measurable baselines and more robust project monitoring would have been necessary to identify results from pilot activities, e.g. in the interfaith dialogue pilot, the work with the NCTC and in the cooperation with SONYO and UNITA in Somaliland. This is a clear recommendation for STRIVE II. In general, the team finds that quality of project documentation was not specific (measurable) enough for use as baseline for monitoring and that this also had implications for learning, as discussed elsewhere in this report. Reporting has been primarily activity focused with little attention paid to the potential for longer term outcomes (and impact).

On the other hand, the reporting (particularly the six-monthly reporting from the STRIVE project team) has collated a potentially very useful set of lessons learned. Although often related to process, these are nonetheless valuable. It is understood that the STRIVE team is in the process of collating these lessons with a view to issuing a consolidated report. The team supports this intention. Also in relation to reporting, the evaluation team has a minor comment concerning the structure of the six-monthly reports and the inclusion of a sizeable threat assessment section. While interesting, the team see this as time-consuming and not directly relevant to the project. If the main purpose of the extensive threat assessment is to inform EU and other stakeholders, a separate threat update report could be considered, with the project reporting focusing on project progress, learning and achievements only.

Finally, the evaluation team finds that STRIVE could have engaged in more systematic and regular assessment of project risks. This includes security risks for staff, NKE and partners, as well as risks for not achieving, and reputational risks for STRIVE, RUSI and the EU. While the STRIVE team was fully aware of all risks related to planned and on-going activities, these were not systematically written down, recorded and discussed and shared with implementing partners. For example, the alternative voices pilot sent youth monitors to radical mosques in Mombasa. While this was very useful for project monitoring purposes, more systematic risk assessment and mitigation measures could have been given. Likewise, the mentorship project will have exposed mentors (and mentees) to risks of targeting from extremist elements operating in the same communities.

4.7   Findings in relation to international best practice

The evaluation was asked to assess whether STRIVE (HoA) has met international standards and best practice in its design, delivery and implementation.

The findings of document research were confirmed by interviews that there is a high degree of conformity between STRIVE and the good practice papers emerging from the international community engaged on CVE activity. STRIVE is also contributing to the latter, which we regard as very positive.

As we note in our methodology, however, there are challenges because of the lack of operational best practice available, with most practice papers focusing instead on general guidance. Accepting this limitation, the team has compared STRIVE's approach and results with relevant parts of the

UN Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism and with two papers from the Global Counter Terrorism Forum (the Ankara Memorandum and the Good Practices on community engagement and community orientated policing).[23] The team notes that these documents were produced after STRIVE was initiated and the project cannot, therefore, be expected to have been designed with them in mind. Nonetheless, the overall conformity between them is viewed as very positive even if it is not possible to assess it in operational detail. Our findings in this regard are included at Annex C.

In summary, the team finds that:

- STRIVE is well aligned with the priority attached to engaging with communities, including through dialogue, mentorship, and processes that encourage contact between citizens' and state authorities. STRIVE also responds well to the recommendation to promote a discourse on violent extremism (while noting the difficulty of pursuing this in some areas).
- STRIVE's focus on youth is very strong, including hard to reach youth (although the results here vary) and on improving inter-generational religious dialogue.
- There has been good alignment in relation to the role of women as change agents (and efforts have been made to ensure that women are included in all STRIVE pilots).
- There has been slightly less alignment in relation to strategic communications, although the work with media (including the Radio Salam pilot) contributes to this area.
- There has been very good alignment with the priority attached to community policing, although as noted above, this needs to be extended in STRIVE II.

4.8 Findings in relation to learning and cooperation

The team has a large number of findings in relation to learning and these have been incorporated in the various sections of this report as appropriate.

STRIVE was set up to start the EU's engagement in the field of CVE, to build up expertise, to contribute to international exchanges on best practice, and to cooperate with other relevant donors in this field. *Learning* was a central theme in STRIVE's approach from the beginning and many lessons have been generated and helped to refine the approach STRIVE has been taking. The first six months of implementation were clearly designed and labelled as inception phase, during which the initial project design was reviewed and refined. The EU was aware that the approach and pilot activities proposed by the initial formulation mission needed to be re-confirmed or revised, based on baseline research and realities on the ground. The evaluators find that this degree of flexibility and the integration of such an inception phase are both very useful and have contributed to the project's relevance.

The wide range of learning also includes experience on designing, implementing and monitoring a CVE programme in the Horn of Africa, as well as experience on cooperating with national authorities on possibly sensitive topics. STRIVE also helped to better understand the capacity of governmental and especially non-governmental partners in Kenya, Somaliland and Puntland and this can inform the future selection of implementing partners for CVE activities. The dissemination of learning has been a core feature of STRIVE's regular reporting to the EC in Brussels; STRIVE's six monthly reports have included updated threat assessments, progress updates from the various results areas, and sections on lessons learned. The team finds that the latter have been insightful and are likely to be of wider use (i.e. beyond STRIVE). A good example of this is provided by the thirty-

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[23] The team would like to note that parts of the UN Action Plan and GCTF papers are directed at national governments and therefore the role of interventions such as STRIVE may be somewhat restricted.

month report (July 2016), which includes valuable learning, particularly in relation to the pre-conditions for successful engagements on CVE and gender issues in Somaliland, youth, mentoring, and communications/media.[24] The team regard it as important that these lessons are collected and disseminated more widely, as it is understood RUSI intend to do. While it must be recognised that such learning is inevitably context specific, and therefore may not be suitable for direct transfer to other localities, it can nonetheless be used to help inform CVE programming more widely, provided that it is appropriately packaged.

4.8.1   Learning and cooperation within the EU system

The evaluation team finds that STRIVE has contributed in a number of ways to increasing the EU's knowledge about CVE and radicalisation in the Horn of Africa region as well as thematically. Direct exchanges took place between the STRIVE team, especially the Team Leader, and various bodies and projects within the EU system. For example, the Team Leader regularly exchanged information and met with the STRIVE Pakistan project as well as the Global STRIVE project implemented by Hedayah, which was set up at the same time as the EU's second pilot project on Pakistan. The Team Leader also presented STRIVE in EU meetings in Brussels and to a number of different EU working groups and bodies.

In addition, the Team Leader has travelled extensively to participate in workshops, conferences and the meetings of the GCTF on CVE, including in Jakarta, Washington, Abu Dhabi and Brussels. This clearly increased the visibility both of STRIVE and of the EU's engagement in this field. As a consequence, STRIVE is widely known as a "brand", and is associated with the EU.

Since STRIVE was launched, the EU has started **regional CVE trainings for staff at EU Delegations, EU member states' embassies as well as national participants from government and civil society in the countries covered.**, The first year of this was delivered by the Global Centre on Cooperative Security and subsequently by RUSI. The Team Leader has regularly participated in these trainings and has presented STRIVE and examples from STRIVE's work. Most recently, the Team Leader has travelled to various EU Delegations in Africa in order to advise and support the EU's future engagement in the fields of violent extremism and radicalisation in the countries concerned. More broadly, findings emerging from the project have appeared in a number of publications, mostly through contributions from the Team Leader. A recent example of this is the RUSI Whitehall Report on *Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) and Risk Reduction.*[25]

While the personal outreach of STRIVE staff appears exemplary, the evaluation team finds that the dissemination of knowledge, lessons and good practice beyond this within the EU system could have been even wider and more systematic. The EU Delegation in Nairobi, for example, did not always appear aware of STRIVE's reporting.

4.8.2   Cooperation amongst donors

The EU Delegation in Nairobi actively participates in donor coordination and STRIVE - being among the most visible and known EU projects in Nairobi - has been discussed several times in donor meetings, which has increased STRIVE's visibility further. The evaluation team finds that there would be value in strengthening linkages between donors and implementing agencies so that more operational knowledge about what approaches to CVE work and why in specific locations is more widely available. The current arrangements, which include the Nairobi donor centred CVE

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[24] Thirty-Month Report, STRIVE, 20 July 2016
[25]   https://rusi.org/publication/whitehall-reports/countering-violent-extremism-and-risk-reduction-guide-programme-design

coordination group as well as informal bilateral contacts, appear to work as a means of exchanging information at programmatic level. Donors consulted knew more or less where each other was engaged and were also well aware of the STRIVE project at an overall level. The STRIVE team leader had been present in early meetings of the group, although she is not a formal member and does not currently participate, as it is a donor rather than an implementer's forum.

In relation to coordination amongst implementers, the team is aware that there is a new CVE consultative forum in Nairobi, although the large membership may make the initiative unwieldy.[26] This perhaps illustrates the difficulty of coordination in the CVE area, where there is some donor-crowding and NGOs have thematic as well as funding interests that may conflict. As a consequence, there is limited dissemination of implementation experience (although RUSI has contributed to what there is) and little evidence so far of joint approaches amongst donors. The team believes that there would be considerable value in improving this situation and that a project like STRIVE, with a clear learning objective, would be a good catalyst.

5   Recommendations

Drawing from the evaluation findings presented above, the team has a number of forward-looking recommendations concerning the design and delivery of CVE projects, the EU engagement, and STRIVE's thematic result areas.

5.1   Recommendations for CVE project design and delivery

a. **It is recommended that CVE projects systematically adopt a theory of change approach during project design that makes assumptions explicit.** This should take its outset in a mapping of actors and clearly focus on at-risk groups and their concerns in order to distinguish CVE interventions from other forms of activity, such as peacebuilding (where there can be considerable overlap). Project relevance is strengthened through inclusive, participatory approaches that secure local buy-in. Arrangements for building trust with the target audience should be prioritised and built into the project, as trust is often a precondition for attitudinal and behavioural change and thus CVE-relevant outcomes and impact. For example, language must be tailored to local sensitivities and efforts made to avoid stereotyping beneficiary groups.

b. **It is recommended that programming includes baseline research and arrangements for monitoring that identifies and validates change assumptions and provides data in response to CVE relevant indicators, thus helping to provide evidence of what works and the pre-conditions involved.** To the extent feasible, the team recommends involving the same experts in the baseline research and project monitoring in order to promote consistency of approach as well as confidence and trust amongst stakeholders and believes that a constant engagement of experts would be beneficial for any pilot for the same reasons. The team notes that large-scale perception surveys, while considered beneficial and a valuable way to assess attitudinal change, are likely to be costly.

c. **It is recommended to engage in systematic risk assessment before and during project implementation in order to understand and mitigate risks as much as possible and promote project impact.** Risk categories include contextual, programmatic, and institutional risks, the latter including personal and reputational risks. STRIVE has

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[26] Led by the Rift Valley Institute

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demonstrated the relevance of thematically competent and politically neutral implementing partner(s) with previous project management experience.

d. **It is recommended to adopt a pilot project approach for the first engagement in a new geographical location that allows for trial and error provided that sufficiently rigorous monitoring arrangements are in place to learn from it**. STRIVE has demonstrated that some contexts are decidedly less permissive than others, emphasising that tailored approaches are needed. The inclusion of an inception phase during project implementation, during which the approach can be tested and finalised has also proven very useful and should be replicated. The focus on learning remains highly relevant in any future CVE project and can be supported by a strong focus on M&E.

e. **It is recommended to have funding available to immediately extend successful pilot projects and thereby maintain the momentum generated (thus strengthening the scope for achieving sustainable results).** Equally, there is a need to prepare for exit from pilots that will not be continued. Risks associated with an exit that is not adequately prepared may include frustration, exposure, incomplete process amongst beneficiaries etc.

f. **Adequate human resources should be made available, especially if CVE projects cover more than one country and/or operate in hard-to-access countries and locations.** If testing pilot approaches is a main focus, the funding agency and selected implementer should consider including a full-time M&E officer position, whose sole responsibility would be to accompany all project work with advice on monitoring and evaluation, to ensure maximum learning from all work and to ensure the quality of implementing partners' work and reporting. As implementing partners may experience capacity constraints (CVE related and/or project management), the project team should be prepared to also provide a mentoring role in these respects.

g. **As implementing partners may experience capacity constraints (CVE related and/or project management), the project team should be prepared to also provide a capacity development and/or mentoring role in these respects**. STRIVE's experience with the capacity of local partners was mixed and, in certain locations, the project had to choose between either not working on CVE or working with those CSOs that were present already. This was particularly the case in Somaliland and Puntland. Through providing an element of capacity development and following this through with longer term mentoring, overall effectiveness can be increased.

5.2   Recommendations for the EU's CVE engagement

h. **Within the EU system, it is recommended to ensure maximum cohesion with other EU funding instruments.** For example, a regional focus of STRIVE activities in the coastal region in Kenya would likely benefit from a strong link with the EU's development support in this region (e.g. with economic development support) to achieve synergies and increased impact of both approaches.

i. **It is recommended to systematise dissemination and information sharing within the EU system to ensure that the relevant EU Delegations have full access to all project reporting and have an opportunity to respond to reports.** Also, wider learning within the EU system and amongst the donor community in Africa and beyond could be

promoted through wider sharing of project reporting. There would be considerable value in improving coordination amongst donors and implementers and a project like STRIVE would be a good catalyst in this regard.

5.3 Recommendations relating to the thematic areas covered by STRIVE

j. **In relation to law enforcement, it is important that sensitisation and capacity development initiatives reach down to front line officers in hot spot areas and their station commanders and are complemented by inter-agency cooperation and institutional change with the aim that performance across relevant agencies and interaction with communities is enhanced.** Achieving this requires political will. STRIVE's experience demonstrates that non-state actors can play an active role but it needs to be backed up politically and administratively (via an MOU for instance). With state agencies also active in this area (agency to agency cooperation), it is relevant to establish coordination fora amongst the donors/implementers concerned. Regarding beneficiary linkages, STRIVE has demonstrated the value in securing a centrally placed counterpart (the NCTC) and nurturing the relationship. The experience suggests that under the right conditions, it is feasible to include other national actors (CSOs) in the arrangement.

k. **In relation to counter radicalisation efforts concerning women and youth, it is recommended to undertake rigorous research into cultural and social norms in the localities concerned so that pre-conditions for change are exposed and can be addressed during project design.** STRIVE has demonstrated that there are significant differences between Somaliland and Kenya (Somaliland being generally more conservative), implying that different approaches are needed. Actor mapping should highlight potential influencers (positive and negative). As one moves from group focused initiatives (e.g. dialogue) to ones more focused on individuals (e.g. mentoring), there will be a need to identify possibilities for referral.

n. **Concerning individuals identified as being at-risk, it is recommended to include initiatives providing mentoring by credible experts who are able to develop a relationship of trust and confidence with the individual(s) concerned.** The team has identified a number of important findings from the STRIVE 1 pilot, including that initiatives prioritise the use of credible and capable mentors who enjoy local respect, are individually targeted and needs/incentives based, and allow sufficient time for the development of trust between mentor and mentee and follow up. Peer influencing approaches may also be worth considering provided they are supervised. It is critical that the mentors concerned have capacity and credibility to perform their roles and that a medium/long term approach is used that extends to monitoring so that evidence of sustainable change is available. The team is conscious that mentors (and mentees) place themselves at personal risk due to the targeting of extremist organisations (n.b. this may argue against strong local anchoring in some cases). Mentoring initiatives should adopt a do-no-harm approach that systematically assesses and monitors risk.

l. **In relation to preventative communications, the evaluation recommends continuing to cooperate with journalists in order to promote good and responsible media coverage of CVE relevant information, especially following violent incidents**. In addition to the current work with print and TV journalists, engagement with social media and social media influencers should be explored. There needs to be a strong analytical basis

of programming so that relevant themes and target groups are identified and that data is collected to assess the impact of transmissions on these groups. The Radio Salam pilot suggests that the choice of radio station is important (there needs to be an audience and the audience needs to be relevant). Presenters need to be sufficiently experienced (also thematically). Support from a media expert with CVE experience appears useful in helping to focus programming. While radio remains a relevant medium in Kenya, social media is also growing in importance.

Annexes

Annex A: Terms of Reference

Terms of Reference (ToR)

Reference: **IFS/2013/ 323-676**

STRIVE	ALL RESULT AREAS
Action	ALL ACTIONS
Expert	Evaluation Team (Lead expert and evaluaiton member)

1. Context
2. Objectives and expected results

STRIVE (Horn of Africa) is part of STRIVE (Strengthening Resilience to Violent Extremism), a EU programme that seeks to prevent terrorism and counter violent extremism while continuing to respect human rights and international law.

STRIVE (HoA) seeks to develop best practice to implement, monitor and evaluate programme that have a demonstrable impact on strengthening resilience against violent extremism in the region. A key objective of STRIVE is, therefore, to enhance the evidence base around what activities work and how they can best be designed to have the most possible impact in the area of countering violent extremism (CVE) programming.

Building on this, a further objective is to provide recommendations around EU's role in this work as well as to provide lessons on implementation, monitoring and evaluation.

Based in the centre of the CVE community this evaluation of the STRIVE pilot aims to provide
2.1 Objectives
analysis of the implementation of STRIVE as well as to further the lessons developed under the
STRIVE is structured around four result areas:
pilot with regards to monitoring and evaluation.

1. Build the regional capacity of security sector & law enforcement authorities to engage with civil society in fighting violent extremism.
2. Strengthened capacity of women's organisations in Puntland and Somaliland to fight violent extremism.
3. Increase the understanding of the challenges faced by EU born Somali youth in Somaliland.
4. Increase the understanding of the drivers of radicalisation among youth in Kenya.

The purpose of this evaluation is therefore to assess the extent to which each and every activity (some of these will be reviewed in the literature review and a selected number will be reviewed in greater details with interviews) contributes to achieving the overall objectives of STRIVE (HoA), and the more specific objectives set out in the four result areas. This will include logframe analysis.

The specific evaluation questions will be further discussed with the evaluators but to the extent possible and relevant following the structure from the OECD DAC criteria of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability.

The objectives of the evaluation therefore are:

- to assess each and every pilot activity (some reviewed in the literature others followed

up with field visit) in STRIVE (HoA) against the stated aims, purpose and objectives of the project and the wider EU programme;

- to assess whether STRIVE (HoA) has met international standards and best practice in its design, delivery and implementation;

- to produce a written report for the EU recording the findings of the study which may become a public document so should be of a publishable standard;

- to produce a set of recommendations for the EU on how best to design, deliver and implement CVE programmes, and what lessons can be learned for other interventions;

- to present these findings at the final STRIVE HoA conference.

2.2	**Expected results**

It is expected that the evaluation team, with the support of the STRIVE (HoA) team and other stakeholders (partners, donors, implementers and local NKEs), lead and deliver the evaluation of the STRIVE (HoA) project.

The evaluation should assess whether the project has met its aims, purpose and objectives; it should present findings relating to good practice in CVE programming and the extent to which the project has embodiedgood practice; and it should identify lessons learned for the benefit of future programmes and specific recommendations for the EU on programming and CVE.

The evaluation team will collect data following a mixed methods approach that allows for the evaluation to answer the evaluation questions. These will be finalised by the STRIVE (HoA) team and the evaluators in the inception report, but are likely to include some or all of the following:

- Were the activities designed to facilitate piloting,
- Were the activities consistent with the aims, purpose and objectives of the project?
- Were the activities relevant to the problem of violent extremism in the HoA?
- Given the changing context, was the amendment which was made to the project's terms of reference justifiable?
- Were the activities implemented efficiently?
- What, so far, has been the outcome of the activities?
- What, so far, has been the impact of the project?
- What are the key findings from each of the 4 result areas?
- How has the project inter-related to other CVE initiatives in the region?

Besides the specific findings of the evaluation the project will be expected to draw up emerging lessons on CVE programming including highlighting recommendations for replication and cancelling, dilemmas, challenges, opportunities, partner roles, communications, methodological aspects (design and approach), M&E lessons, risk management, Do No Harm and conflict sensitivity as well as duty of care.

The results from the evaluation will be reported in a series of documents and oral briefings (see section 4 below).

The evaluators will be expected to develop a matrix to gather, analyse and present the data which answers the evaluation questions.

3. Profile of the proposed Non Key Expert team	
• **Qualifications :**	- Senior evaluator with experience in CVE research and M&E - Strong analytical skills - Strong writing skills for providing short M&E reports - Complex evaluation experience
• **General professional experience**	CVE and conflict-related research Extensive development experience especially relating to peace and security issues
• **Specific experience in relation to the STRIVE mission**	Understanding of the sensitivities and limits of data collection in the area of CVE. Ability to provide concrete and actionable tools as well as analysis.
• **Working language**	English

4. Deliverables

The evaluation team will complete the below tasks:

- Undertake review of STRIVE (HoA) documents as well as other relevant documentation to guide the evaluation (4 days)
- Finalise evaluation questions with the STRIVE (HoA) team (1 day)
- Develop an inception report (max 10 pages) including an evaluation matrix and workplan for the evaluation (1 day)
- Undertake interviews with key stakeholders including (STRIVE (HoA) team, EU delegations, EC officials in DEVCO, partners (GoK, UK, US), NKEs, local partners and other local stakeholders) in Brussels, Nairobi, Mombasa and Hargeisa (10 days)
- Draft and seek feedback on report (max 25 pages excluding annexes) (5 days)
- Finalise report, incorporating stakeholder feedback (2 days)
- Presentation at final STRIVE conference, due to take place in Brussels in October/November 2016 (1 day)

5. Time frame

- 24 NKE days
- Current timeline is focussed on a delivery between June2016 and November 2016

Annex B: Evaluation matrix

Eval criteria	Questions from ToR	Evaluation Approach
Overall	• Assess each and every pilot activity in STRIVE (HoA) against the stated aims, purpose and objectives of the project and the wider EU programme • Assess whether STRIVE (HoA) has met international standards and best practice in its design, delivery and implementation	• Desk study, key stakeholder interviews, focus group • Check against selected available open source documents (e.g. UN Action Plan)
Relevance	• Were the activities consistent with the aims, purpose and objectives of the project? • Were the activities relevant to the problem of violent extremism in the HoA? • Given the changing context, was the amendment which was made to the project's terms of reference justifiable?	For each activity: • Describe methodology, terminology, assumptions • Assess alignment of activities with project goals. Any omissions? • Relate activities to recent context analysis (source?) & other donor activities (coherency) • Assess validity of assumptions • Seek clarification from project team on amendment to ToR • Lessons learnt & recommendations
Effectiveness	• Were the activities designed to facilitate piloting?	• Assess design logic (ToC) & preparatory process • Assess relevance and participation of partners & their capacity • Monitor-ability - clear baseline & indicators? • Realism of expectations regarding results? • Lessons learned & recommendations
Efficiency	• Were the activities implemented efficiently?	• Assess methodological aspects (design and approach) contributing to efficiency • Assess capacity of partners • Quality of indicators • Quality of reporting, approach to M&E • Assess project's approach to risk management, • Handling of Do No Harm and conflict sensitivity, duty of care issues. • Lessons learnt & recommendations
Results	• What, so far, has been the outcome of the activities? • What, so far, has been the impact of the project? • What are the key findings from each of the 4 result areas?	• Identify intended & unintended results • Describe key findings emerging • Identify lessons emerging, including relating to aspects that may/may not be replicable, dilemmas, challenges, opportunities, partner roles, communications • Recommendations

Annex C: Assessment of STRIVE compared to international best practice

The evaluation was asked to assess whether STRIVE (HoA) has met international standards and best practice in its design, delivery and implementation. As we note in our methodology, there are challenges in meeting this request within a relatively time-limited evaluation because of the lack of consolidated and operational best practice available within the CVE literature. Most practice papers focus instead on general policy guidance. Accepting this constraint, the team has compared STRIVE's approach and results with relevant parts of the UN Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism and with two papers from the Global Counter Terrorism Forum (the Ankara Memorandum and the Good Practices on community engagement and community orientated policing).[27] The results are set out below and use the following traffic light system of assessment:

🟩	Good alignment
🟧	Some alignment
🟥	Limited or no alignment

Source	Good practice		STRIVE's alignment with good practice
UN Action Plan			
Engaging communities (para 51)	(a) Develop joint & participatory strategies, confidence building through dialogue platforms	🟩	RA 2, 3 & 4 pilots all promote dialogue, incl. between marginalised groups & authorities. Limited strategic approaches, except support for CSO coordination platform in Kenya;
	(b) Adopt community policing models in partnership with communities & based on human rights	🟩	Main focus of RA 1 has been sensitisation and training of law enforcement. Needs to be rolled out at local police station level.
	(c) Local & family based mentorship based on one-to-one mentorship	🟩	RA 4 mentorship pilot fully in line with this at community level (no state involvement)
	(f) Regional networks for civil society, youth, religious leaders	🟧	RA 1 has sought to promote CSO networking in Kenya. RA 4 pilots have used networks of faith based organisations (CICC & CIPK).
	(g) Promote a discourse on VE drivers	🟩	RA 2, 3 & 4 pilots have promoted discourse.
Empowering youth (para 52)	(b) Integrate youth into decision-making, e.g. through youth councils	🟩	RA 3 and 4 pilots have promoted youth engagement
	(c) Foster trust through inter-generational dialogue	🟥	Not a specific focus but some aspects in RA 4 pilots (e.g. inter-faith, Radio Salam)
	(d) Involve hard to reach youth in CVE	🟩	RA 3 (diaspora youth) & RA 4 pilots (e.g. mentorship, inter-faith, Radio Salam)
	(e) Establish mentoring programmes & opportunities for community service	🟩	RA 4 mentorship programme directly aligned to this.
	(f) Funding, including small grants to develop youth to strengthen community	🟧	Not a specific focus but some aspects relate to RA 3 and RA 4 pilots

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[27] The team would like to note that parts of the UN Action Plan and GCTF papers are directed at national governments and therefore the role of interventions such as STRIVE may be somewhat restricted.

	resilience	orange	
Gender equality & empowering women (para 53)	(a) Mainstream gender perspectives	green	RA 2, including women police and role of women in communities
	(b) Invest in gender sensitive research on women's roles in VE	green	RA 2
	(c) Include women in law enforcement, as part of CVE	green	Partially RA 1 and a focus in RA 2
	(d) Build capacity of women & civil society to engage in prevention	green	RA 2
Communications (para 55)	(a) Develop national strategies to challenge the narratives associated with VE	red	Policy level was not a focus area of STRIVE. However, communications work with media and Radio Salam pilot has challenged narratives.
	(b) Research on misuse of internet & social media and VE	orange	Preventative communications research
	(c) Promote grass-roots efforts to advance tolerance, pluralism & understanding	green	RA 2, RA 3 and RA 4 pilots
	(e) Empower victims to tell their stories	red	Some focus in preventative communications
GCTF			
Community engagement & community policing	(1) Approach engagement & community policing as a long term sustained strategy & do research to understand local grievances	green	RA 1 and RA 4 pilots are relevant
	(2) Establish methods to build trust in the community	green	RA 1, 2, 3, and 4 pilots have sought to improve trust between citizens and authorities
	(3) Ensure that engagement is fully inclusive	green	All STRIVE pilots have sought this
	(5) Engage women as positive change agents	green	Especially RA 2
	(6) Engage youth and leverage schools for positive messages	green	Especially RA 3 and RA 4 pilots
	(8) Empower communities to develop a counter narrative through the media	orange	Some alignment through Radio Salam and preventative communications
	(9) Engage former extremists and also victims to communicate counter narratives	orange	RA 4 (mentorship & Radio Salam) and preventative communications
	(10) Tailor community policing to address local issues and instil awareness of indicators	orange	Limited focus but is underpinned through RA 1 (curriculum & training)
	(11) Build assessment metrics into projects during concept development	orange	Research undertaken for most pilots. However, baselines, indicators and ToC weak in all STRIVE pilots.
GCTF Ankara	(6) Developing shared	orange	Limited focus, although some alignment in RA 1

Memorandum	understandings amongst governmental and non-governmental agencies	🟧	and RA 4 pilots
	(12) Promote tolerance and facilitate dialogue	🟩	Feature of RA 3 and RA 4 pilots
	(13) Amplify voices that oppose exploitation of religion	🟩	Especially RA 4 inter-faith and alternative voices pilots
	(14) Special emphasis on youth	🟩	RA 3 and RA 4 pilots
	(16) Promote economic opportunity amongst at risk population	🟧	Limited. Some attention in RA 4 (mentorship)
	(1/) Role of women within families and communities	🟩	RA 2
	(18) Law enforcement to acknowledge need to build trust	🟩	Key feature of RA 1 (curriculum & training)
	(19) Training to law enforcement on CVE	🟩	Key feature of RA 1 (curriculum & training)

Annex D: Assignment schedule

Period	Activity	Location
September 2016	Preparation, desk review	Home-based
18 September 2016	Arrival consultants	Nairobi
19 September	Interviews	Nairobi
20 September	Interviews; travel in the evening	Nairobi; Mombasa
21 September	Interviews; travel in the evening	Mombasa; Nairobi
22 September	Interviews	Nairobi
23 September	Travel	Hargeisa
24 September	Interviews; travel in the evening	Hargeisa; Nairobi
25 September	Interviews	Nairobi
26 September	Interviews and focus group discussions	Nairobi
27 September	Departure consultants	
October 2016	Report writing	Home-based
24 November 2016	Presentation of evaluation at EU conference	Brussels
December 2016	Submission of Final report	Home-based

Annex E: Documents consulted

Document name	Document date	Author	Type
STRIVE, Twelve-Month Report, Submitted 30th January 2015	30/01/15	Project / RUSI	Project reporting to EU
Revised Technical Offer	30/09/13	Project / RUSI	Project reporting to EU
ANNEX II, SERVICE CONTRACT No. IFS/2013/ 323-676, INSTRUMENT FOR STABILITY, COUNTERING TERRORISM. Strengthening Resilience to Violence and Extremism (STRIVE) in the Horn of Africa, STRIVE HOA; ANNEX II: TERMS OF REFERENCE		European Commission	Project reporting to EU
STRIVE, Inception Report	22/05/14	Project / RUSI	Project reporting to EU
Re-Submitted Six Month Report	20/08/14	Project / RUSI	Project reporting to EU
STRIVE 1 pager		Project / RUSI	Project reporting to EU
STRIVE Final Fiche		Project / RUSI	Project reporting to EU
STRIVE Thirty-Month Report	20/07/16	Project / RUSI	Project reporting to EU
STRIVE Twenty-Four-Month Report	29/01/16	Project / RUSI	Project reporting to EU
STRIVE Eighteen-Month Report	10/07/15	Project / RUSI	Project reporting to EU
Strategic Communications in support of STRIVE, Progress Report and Plan	06/11/15	Project / RUSI	Media and strategic communication
Examining the Relationship between Media Communications and Countering Violent Extremism in Kenya. Report of the Focus Group Discussion held on 17 March 2016, Nairobi, Kenya		Project / RUSI	Media and strategic communication
Final report of the communications project in support of STRIVE	21/06/16?	Matt Frear, Communication Specialist	Media and strategic communication
Countering Violent Extremism by building relations between law enforcement and civil society			Result Area 1
Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) National Civil Society Coordination Initiative. Strategy		Hassan Ole Naado, SUPKEM	Result Area 1

Non Key Expert (NKE) Report on the CVE Workshops held in Nakuru, Kilifi, Kisumu, Kakamega and Machakos		Hassan Ole Naado, SUPKEM	Result Area 1
Curriculum: Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) for Law Enforcement Agencies in Kenya	July 2016	NCTC and STRIVE Horn of Africa	Result Area 1
UNITA CVE Training Briefing Note	03/12/15		Result Area 2
A study of the Role of Women in Countering Violent Extremism in Somaliland and Puntland Research Briefing	June 2015	Project / RUSI	Result Area 2
Draft Briefing Note to Government of Somaliland		Project / RUSI	Result Area 2
Mission Report: Field visit to Garowe (Puntland) and Hargeisa (Somaliland), 5-10 May 2014		Project / RUSI	Result Area 2
Draft: Qualitative Research. To strengthen the capacity of women's organizations in Puntland in fighting violent extremism		Project / RUSI	Result Area 2
Guide for Key Informant Interviews: Questionnaire addressing the Role of women in preventing Violent Extremism from the youth in Bossaso, Garowe and Galkayo of Puntland		Project / RUSI	Result Area 2
Focus Group Discussion Guide		Project / RUSI	Result Area 2
Questionnaire addressing the Role of women in preventing Violent Extremism from the youth in Bossaso, Garowe and Galkayo of Puntland		Project / RUSI	Result Area 2
Study on the role of women in Violent Extremism and Mapping Women Organizations as potential partners for CVE activities in Somaliland	September 2014	Ifrah Mohamed, Academy for Peace and Development	Result Area 2
Power point presentation: Lessons from study on women in SL			Result Area 2
Somaliland Women Lawyer Association in Hargeisa			Result Area 2
Questionnaire Key Informant Interviews: Strengthen the capacity of women's organizations in Somaliland to fight violent extremism	July 2014		Result Area 2
Questionnaire Focus Group Discussion: Strengthen the capacity of women's organizations in Somaliland to fight violent extremism	July 2014		Result Area 2
Community Meeting Report: Strengthening the capacity of women's	February 2016	UNITA	Result Area 2

organizations in Somaliland to fight violent extremism			
Women's Peace Committee capacity pre-assessment	November 2015	UNITA	Result Area 2
Report on Women Police and Women Peace Forum Capacity Building Work Shop	02/16	UNITA	Result Area 2
Second security stakeholders meeting	06/16	UNITA	Result Area 2
Final Work Plan		UNITA	Result Area 2
Report on Capacity building training workshop for women's peace committees in Togdheer region, Somaliland	12/15	UNITA	Result Area 2
UNITA CVE Training Briefing Note	12/15		Result Area 2
Power point presentation: STRIVE "Strengthening Resilience to Violent Extremism in the Horn of Africa"		Project / RUSI	Result Area 2
Power point presentation: Building and Sustaining Individual and Community Resilience: Understanding trauma and cycles of violence TURTLE BAY, MALINDI		Victoria Mutiso, Africa Mental Heath Association	Result Area 2
EU CVE Training Brussels	05/15	Martine Zeuthen	Result Area 2
A study of the Role of Women in Countering Violent Extremism in Somaliland and Puntland. Research Briefing	06/15	Project / RUSI	Result Area 2
M&E Proposed work plan			Result Area 2
Pre-Evaluation Tool for Civil Society Training			Result Area 2
Post-Evaluation Tool for Civil Society Training			Result Area 2
Potential Mentees Guide			Result Area 2
Assessment Implementation schedule		UNITA	Result Area 2
Community meetings agenda			Result Area 2
Community Meetings Report	03/16	UNITA	Result Area 2
Women's Peace Committee capacity pre-assessment	11/15	UNITA	Result Area 2
Detailed Project Work Plan			Result Area 2
Pre-Assessment Questionnaire: Foomka Qiimeynta awooda Gudiyada		UNITA	Result Area 2
Training Plan: Capacity building training workshop on CVE for 35 women from Women Peace Forum and Police women in Burao			Result Area 2
Detailed Work Plan		UNITA	Result Area 2
CV Hussein Mohamed Mohamoud		Hussein	Result Area 2

		Mohamed Mohamoud	
Non Key Expert agreement with Hussein Mohamed Mohamoud	10/15	Project / RUSI	Result Area 2
CV Mohamed Jama Aden		Mohamed Jama Aden	Result Area 2
Non Key Expert agreement with Mohamed Jama Aden	10/15	Project / RUSI	Result Area 2
ToR Mohamed Jama Aden		Project / RUSI	Result Area 2
ToR Hussein Mohamed Mohamoud		Project / RUSI	Result Area 2
The project review & Exposure visits report	05/16	UNITA	Result Area 2
Second security stakeholders meeting	05/16	UNITA	Result Area 2
FINAL REPORT – STRIVE PROJECT	07/16	UNITA	Result Area 2
Programme Achievements		UNITA	Result Area 2
Summery Note For The Stakeholders Consultative and Project Planning Workshop		SONYO	Result Area 3
A report of Focus Group Discussion on locally born youth and Diaspora born youth	08/16		Result Area 3
Compiled Islamic Forums Draft Report	03/16	SONYO	Result Area 3
Exposure Visit and Sports for Change tournaments report	05/16	SONYO	Result Area 3
STRIVE Project Final Report	08/16	SONYO	Result Area 3
STRIVE FGD Report			Result Area 3
Summary report of SONYO's Islamic forum for Diaspora youth in Borama	04/16		Result Area 3
Summary report on the Focus Group Discussion of SONYO's Islamic forum for Diaspora youth	03/16		Result Area 3
Summary report on the Focus Group Discussion of UNITA's Women Police and Women Peace Forum Capacity Building training	03/16		Result Area 3
Somaliland Youth Education. Mapping Education and Socio-cultural trends	09/14	Altai Consulting	Result Area 3
Somali Youth Leaders Initiative (SYLI) weekly update	12/15	SONYO	Result Area 3
Implementing Partner's Micro-Assessment of Somaliland National Youth		UNICEF	Result Area 3

Organization (SONYO)			
Concept Note: Promoting Youth Resilience against Violent Extremism for Peace, Stability and Development Supportive to the larger global peace of the World	06/14	SONYO	Result Area 3
STRIVE Project Final Report	08/16	SONYO	Result Area 3
Brief Introduction of Coast Interfaith Council of Clerics Trust (CICC)			Result Area 4
Draft workplan CICC		Project / RUSI	Result Area 4
Countering Violent Extremism in Kenya. Inter religious Dialogue report	06/15	CICC	Result Area 4
Youth and County Officials Dialogue Report	08/15	CICC	Result Area 4
Youth Sensitization Forum Summary Report	07/15	CICC	Result Area 4
Sermon Guide		The Council of Imams and Preachers in Kenya	Result Area 4
Front Page: Capacity building manual	08/15	The Council of Imams and Preachers in Kenya	Result Area 4
Sermon Monitors' Weekly Activity Reporting tool	01/16	The Council of Imams and Preachers in Kenya	Result Area 4
Concept Paper for De-Radicalisation Program		Radio Salaam	Result Area 4
Update of Feature stories Radio Salam		Radio Salaam	Result Area 4
Radio Salaam Research Report		Hawa Noor M.	Result Area 4
From the Graves to the Grounds: Fostering Resilient Communities and Youth	06/15	Street Radio & UNEME Sports Welfare	Result Area 4
2nd Forum Report: From the Graves to the Grounds: Fostering resilient Communities and Youth	02/15	Street Radio & UNEME Sports Welfare	Result Area 4
Mentorship Report: From the Graves to the Grounds: Fostering resilient Communities and Youth		Street Radio & UNEME Sports Welfare	Result Area 4
Leadership Dialogue Project		Supreme	Result Area 4

		Council of Kenya Muslims (SUPKEM)	