Thinking Globally and Acting Locally:
The EU's Global Strategy and Implications for Counterterrorism and Preventing Violent Extremism—Food for Thought[1]

Abstract

This think piece assesses the Global Strategy on the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy (EUGS) and presents ideas on how the EUGS helps the EU to address terrorism and prevent and counter violent extremism with its partners. It provides the background of the development of the Global Strategy and its assessment of the current threat landscape before exploring the Global Strategy's potential for helping the EU to enhance and sustain its efforts to prevent and counter violent extremism and counter terrorism, including by leveraging its diplomatic and capacity-building comparative advantages and deepening its cooperation with partners such as the United Nations. With emphasis on ensuring more efficient and coherent EU external action, the piece concludes with some reflections on the crucial issue of implementing the EUGS and some recommendations for the EU to consider in the near and medium term.

Executive Summary

The Global Strategy on the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy (EUGS) was released in June 2016 after a year-long process which was directed by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Informed by input from EU Member States and EU institutions as well as think tanks and civil society organisations, the EUGS begins by highlighting concerns about terrorism and other threats that have increased on European soil and beyond over the past decade. The EUGS also looks at opportunities that lie ahead to preface its vision for the EU to tap its potential and use the tools it has at its disposal to address five key priorities: 1.) the security of the Union; 2.) state and societal resilience to the East and South; 3.) an integrated approach to conflicts; 4.) cooperative regional orders; and 5.) global governance for the 21st century.

This think piece examines how the EUGS can add value to the EU's efforts on counterterrorism and preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE). It notes that the concept of resilience is at the heart of P/CVE and the EUGS places a premium on promoting resilience to prevent conflict, improve governance, and provide a bulwark for communities to resist radicalisation and recruitment from violent extremists.

Noting that the EU has already developed and implemented a variety of counterterrorism and P/CVE-specific projects around the world, this think piece asserts that EUGS should build upon existing efforts rather than start from scratch.

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[1] By Alistair Millar, Executive Director of the Global Center on Cooperative Security, a member of the EU funded CT-MORSE Consortium (http://ct-morse.eu/).

Linking the EUGS's vision with the Sustainable Development Goals is also discussed. The Global Strategy provides an opportunity to learn more about how the investment in the fundamental elements of good governance can be applied in a concerted way to address the drivers of violent extremism as well as how the EUGS could also help to encourage a more rigorous assessment about how violent extremism is undermining development and good governance with data from the field.

Opportunities for using strategic engagement in the field and with partners through diplomatic channels is examined along with the importance of aligning future capacity-building efforts with the breadth of scope offered in the EUGS.

With emphasis on ensuring more efficient and coherent EU external action, the think piece concludes by assessing the essential elements required for implementing the Global Strategy, noting the importance of not only devoting sufficient resources, but also ensuring that there is enough momentum to sustain implementation over the long term. This is followed by six core recommendations for the EU to consider to make use of the EUGS and maximise the impact of its P/CVE and CT programming, ranging from enhancing early warning of conflicts to investing more in the EU's diplomatic presence and strategic communications reach.

Introduction

On 28 June 2016 the Global Strategy on the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy (EUGS) was presented to the European Council by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the Commission. With the title *Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe*, the document takes an expansive view, using the term "Global" to cover not only geography but also the breadth of policies and instruments the EU has at hand to support the Global Strategy's implementation; and it presents an updated approach to guide the European Union in the face of an array of complex and evolving challenges and threats.

While the Global Strategy traverses a number of critical security and foreign policy issues,[2] the focus of this think piece is to present ideas on how the EUGS helps the EU to address terrorism and prevent violent extremism with its partners. This think piece examines the tools outlined in the Global Strategy—from diplomacy and development to strategic communications and security cooperation, among others—that can all be brought to bear in conjunction with existing EU instruments in order to more effectively enhance community resilience and help prevent and counter violent extremism inside and outside the EU. The next section addresses some of the core opportunities and challenges that lie ahead as the process of implementing the EUGS takes shape. It concludes with some recommendations for the EU to consider going forward.

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[2] These issues include consideration of what it signals for the future of EU enlargement policy, relations with Russia, or sharing the burden of defence spending.

Background on the EU Global Strategy

The need for a new strategy on security and foreign policy was raised as a priority objective by Federica Mogherini even before she assumed her position as High Representative in the autumn of 2014.[3] By then, there was no doubt that Europe's situation had changed significantly since 2003 when the EU adopted its first European Security Strategy (ESS). Although the EU did identify terrorism as a threat, the ESS was written before the "Arab Spring"; before the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) became apparent after a split with al-Qaida in April 2013; and before ISIL-influenced attacks beyond the battlefields of Syria, Iraq, and Libya, which resulted in a palpable increase in radicalisation and terrorist attacks in Europe.[4]

In 2003 the EES began with this sentence: "Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure nor so free."[5] By contrast, the EUGS paints a bleaker picture, acknowledging that the "Union is under threat," and that "[w]e live in times of existential crisis, within and beyond the European Union."[6] It confronts the reality that there has been a marked deterioration in the threat landscape over the past decade. Large-scale attacks on public transportation in Spain and the United Kingdom by al-Qaida and more recent attacks in France, Belgium, and Germany inspired by or directed by ISIL illustrate the severity of the situation.[7] As has been noted by Europol, "the EU is currently witnessing an upward trend in the scale, frequency and impact of terrorist attacks in the jurisdictions of Member States" and a major contributing factor has been a corresponding spike in the number of foreign terrorist fighters travelling to, and returning from, conflict zones in the Middle East and elsewhere with the intent of supporting or committing atrocities.[8] At the same time, the EUGS acknowledges that economic volatility and increases in mass migration have added to the pressures on the EU. All of these factors make the security situation even more complex.

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[3] See Nathalie Tocci, "The Making of the EU Global Strategy," *Contemporary Security Policy* 37, no. 3 (2016): 461, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2016.1232559.

[4] Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi announced al-Qaida operations in Syria and changed the group's name to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in April 2013. See Stanford University, "Mapping Militant Organizations: The Islamic State," updated 4 April 2016, http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/1.

[5] European Council, *A Secure Europe in Better World: European Security Strategy*, 12 December 2003, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf.

[6] European Union, *Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe*, June 2016, p. 7, https://europa.eu/globalstrategy/en/european-security-strategy-secure-europe-better-world.

[7] For example, attacks in Madrid (March, 2004), London (July, 2005), and Paris (January, 2015) were carried out by al-Qaida and its affiliates. Attacks in Tours (December, 2014), Paris (November 2015), Brussels (May, 2014 and March, 2016), Nice (July, 2016), and Berlin (December, 2016), were carried out by individuals believed to be associated or inspired with ISIL. This list is not exhaustive and other attacks have also occurred in Europe in the last decade without known/specified links to al-Qaida or ISIL. See University of Maryland, National Consortium for the Study and Responses to Terrorism, "Global Terrorism Database," accessed 1 February 2017, http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/.

[8] Europol European Counter Terrorism Centre, *Changes in Modus Operandi of Islamic State (IS) Revisited*, November 2016, p. 14, https://www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/islamic-state-changing-terror-tactics-to-maintain-threat-in-europe.

With these concerns on the forefront of their agenda, the European Council provided the mandate for the development of the new Global Strategy in June 2015,[9] emphasizing the continued importance of countering terrorism as a key priority.[10] Over the course of the year that followed, drafting the EUGS was informed by a process that "was always supposed to be as if not more important than the product itself," with the finished document acknowledging input from EU Member States and institutions as well as think tanks and civil society organisations with a combination of written comments and feedback from over fifty events across the EU.[11]

Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism

Throughout the document, the EUGS continually highlights the need for a multidimensional approach that is essential for preventing as well as countering the threat of violent extremism. For instance, the EUGS highlights five key priorities: 1.) the security of the Union; 2.) state and societal resilience to the East and South; 3.) an integrated approach to conflicts; 4.) cooperative regional orders; and 5.) global governance for the 21st century.

Each of these priorities are relevant to P/CVE efforts and the connection to these efforts is underscored in one of the Global Strategy's core messages: "[t]he EU will live up to its values internally and externally: this is the strongest antidote we have against violent extremism."[12] Indeed, as Sinan Ülgen, a visiting scholar at Carnegie Europe has explained, "for Europe, human security issues are being transformed into homeland security issues. Europe must strategize policies, formulate responses and develop tools to tackle internal and external human security issues."[13] This point has also been echoed as evidence surfaces in cases where individuals return from conflicts in the Middle East to commit terrorist acts in Europe, underlining internal and external dimensions of the acute security problems that EU is facing.[14]

The EUGS calls for an integrated approach with focus on all stages of conflict and levels of governance (from the local to international). This brings a wider focus than the comprehensive approach that is already guiding EU support to third countries, such as

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[9] European Council, Council of the European Union, "European Council, 25-26/06/2015," (25 and 26 June 2015), http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/european-council/2015/06/25-26/.

[10] It is worth noting that the European Council referred in this regard to its earlier Conclusions of February 2015, where the Council decided in the wake of the Charlie Hebdo attacks in France the month before, "to step up, as a matter of urgency, its external action on countering terrorism in particular in the Mediterranean, the Middle East, including Yemen, and North Africa, in particular also Libya, and the Sahel. Counter-terrorism (CT) will be mainstreamed fully into EU foreign policy." See European Council, Council of the European Union, "Council conclusions on counter-terrorism," 9 February 2015, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/02/150209-council-conclusions-counter-terrorism/.

[11] Tocci, "The Making of the EU Global Strategy," 463, 465.

[12] European Union, *Shared Vision, Common Action,* p. 21.

[13] Sinan Ülgen, "EU Global Strategy: A Transformed Security Landscape," Carnegie Europe, 1 February 2016, http://carnegieeurope.eu/2016/02/01/eu-global-strategy-transformed-security-landscape-pub-62711.

[14] Gilles de Kerchove, "Report on the Implementation of the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy," Council of the European Union Document 13981/14, sent to EU Counter-Terrorism Delegations on 10 October 2014. Copy on file with the author.

Somalia, to address sustainable development, peace and security, in a fragile context using a variety of different funding instruments.[15] Moving from the comprehensive approach to the new EUGS vision of an integrated approach will be addressed in the last section of this paper, focused on implementation, noting both country and regional as well as thematic strategies will need to be developed in a more systematic manner to allow future actions to be applied to all levels of conflict and governance.

Counterterrorism

The EUGS devotes a specific section to the topic of "counterterrorism". It includes harder security measures that relate to intelligence sharing and cyber security as well as preventive efforts, noting that the EU "will deepen work on education, communication, culture, youth and sport to counter violent extremism." Furthermore, the EUGS explains that "[The EU] will work on counter-radicalisation by broadening our partnerships with civil society, social actors, the private sector and the victims of terrorism, as well as through inter-religious and inter-cultural dialogue."[16] This sentiment builds upon the EU's Counterterrorism Strategy (EUCTS) of 2005, which presents four pillars as complementary strands of action (Prevent, Protect, Pursue, and Respond) with cross cutting contributions from a host of actors within the EU and its Member States.[17] In the decade that has elapsed since the EUCTS was drafted, it is still relevant in so far as it shows the continued importance of working across all four pillars. However, the threat has evolved and the EUGS contains an additional emphasis on combining international and external policies in a "more joined-up" approach, calling "for tighter institutional links between our external action and the internal area of freedom, security and justice" as well as strengthening the necessary connections between security and development policies.[18]

When looking ahead to the task of implementation, the EUGS points out that it will be necessary to "revise existing sectoral strategies, as well as devise and implement new thematic or geographic strategies in line with the political priorities of this Strategy."[19]

It is important to update the EUCTS so that it takes stock of the current threat and is informed by lessons that have emerged in the field and among researchers and practitioners, including the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN), founded with support from the European Commission in 2011, bringing in several thousand experts and front-line practitioners from all over Europe.[20] While it is clear that the evidence

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[15] National Indicative Programme for the Federal Republic of Somalia 2014-2020 available online at: https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/nip-somalia-20140619_en.pdf

[16] European Union, *Shared Vision, Common Action,* p. 21.

[17] Council of the European Union, *The European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy*, 14469/4/05 Rev. 4, 30 November 2005, http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2014469%202005%20REV%204.

[18] European Union, *Shared Vision, Common Action,* p. 50.

[19] European Union, *Shared Vision, Common Action,* p. 51.

[20] European Commission Migration and Home Affairs, "Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN)," n.d., https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network_en.

base that informs P/CVE is still not fully developed, the work that the EU has funded in the field, combined with other research, does provide a stronger basis from which to reformulate a counterterrorism strategy that is more up to date and in line with the joined-up approach articulated in the EUGS. Furthermore in keeping with EUGS vision of an integrated approach it would be useful to take stock of existing strategies to see not only how they can be updated, but also where there is missing geographic coverage. For example there are regional and country strategies/Action Plans for Syria/Iraq CT/Foreign Fighters strategy, EU Pakistan CT/security strategy, Sahel development and security strategy [21] and EU Horn of Africa/Yemen Counter Terrorism Action Plans. Areas of North Central and South Africa are not covered by such Strategies. Also the many existing plans need to be updated to focus on changes in the threat environment. This review should also align the strategies with the integrated approach in the EU Global Strategy entailing a more granular examination of the stages of conflict from latent to emerging and post conflict situations along with assessments of local, national, regional and international dynamics. In the realm of P/CVE and counterterrorism, this would help to inform how resources can be applied to support tailored prevention efforts in some situations and counterterrorism measures (such as customs and border control capacity building) or community resilience (for example in post conflict situations).

The EUGS also places a premium on promoting and strengthening resilience, which is at the heart of P/CVE. In fact, the document mentions the word "resilience" 34 times, and ties the concept to the ability of "states and societies to reform, thus withstanding and recovering from internal and external crises—benefits us and countries in our surrounding regions, sowing the seeds for sustainable growth and vibrant societies."[22] There is particular emphasis in the EUGS on promoting resilience in the east and south of Europe, "stretching into Central Asia and south down to central Africa," and it is worth noting that a "whole of society" approach is advocated so that the EU engages with and supports "not only state institutions" but all individuals in a manner that is consistent with the ethos of the SDGs. [23]

Looking at the geographic focus in the EUGS that is east and south of Europe, the EU has already developed and implemented a variety of counterterrorism and P/CVE specific projects in Central Asia[24] the Euro-Med region,[25] the Middle East and North Africa

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[21] EEAS "Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel" available online at:
http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/africa/docs/sahel_strategy_en.pdf

[22] European Union, *Shared Vision, Common Action,* p. 23.

[23] European Union, *Shared Vision, Common Action,* p. 23.

[24] For example the United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia receives support from the EU under its IcSP (Art. 3) for "comprehensive implementation of the Joint Plan of Action for Central Asia under the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy."

[25] The Global Center on Cooperative Security, with support from the EU under its IcSP (Art. 5) implemented a project with the Institute for Security Studies and the International Institute for Justice and the Rule of Law (IIJ) in the Euro-Med region focused on building capacity of senior judicial officials to engage in counterterrorism cases in a rule-of-law consistent and effective manner. See Melissa Lefas and Junko Nozawa, "Delivering Justice: Views from Supreme Courts in the Euro-Med Region on Countering Terrorism," December 2016, http://www.globalcenter.org/publications/delivering-justice-views-from-supreme-courts-on-countering-terrorism/.

region,[26] the Horn of Africa,[27] as well as programming with a global[28] geographic remit. This approach will allow the EU to build upon existing efforts in a way that aligns with the EUGS without starting from scratch. The EUGS provides an opportunity to build upon, align and identify where the CT and P/CVE elements of the EUGS intersect with existing regional security strategies.

Furthermore, linking the Strategy's vision with the SDGs provides an opportunity to learn more about: a.) how investments in the fundamental elements of good governance can be applied in a concerted way to address the drivers of violent extremism and violence more broadly, and b.) how the EUGS could also help to encourage the EU as well as other partners such as the World Bank and UNDP to undertake a more rigorous assessment with data from the field to highlight the ways violent extremism is undermining development and good governance. The UN Secretary-General's PVE "Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism" offers some general observations about this problem, noting that "violent extremists are also disrupting the day-to-day work of development actors,"[29] but more specific and systematic evidence of how violent extremism hinders development, would help to further highlight the negative impact that violent extremism is having on EU cooperation around the world.

Linkage with the United Nations to further P/CVE and CT Objectives

The connection with the EUGS and efforts initiated at the global level is evident, for example, with the United Nations Global Counterterrorism Strategy (2006) and the more recent PVE "Plan of Action" from the UN Secretary-General (2015), both of which highlight the importance of a holistic approach to preventing violent extremism, with the latter encouraging all UN member states to develop their own PVE plans of action and build their capacity to address the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism and prevent the radicalization and recruitment of violent extremists. At the UN General Assembly in July 2016 the EU highlighted the recent release of the EUGS and noted the linkages with the United Nations' strategic efforts and that both are "united in our efforts to create a strong front against all forms and manifestations of terrorism and violent extremism."[30]

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[26] For example, an action has been formulated for the implementation of capacity building of the League of Arab States, CT Technical Assistance Facility, with pilot projects in selected countries, which aims to build effective, rule-of-law compliant criminal justice systems against terrorism in MENA region. This supported by the IcSP (Art 5.)

[27] For example, the EU funds the Strengthening Resilience to Violence and Extremism (STRIVE) project in the Horn of Africa under IcSP (Art 5), implemented by the Royal United Services Institute. The project aims to develop best practices to implement and monitor programmes that have demonstrable impact on strengthening resilience against extremism and violence. For more information about this and other STRIVE-related projects see European Commission, *STRIVE for Development*, 2015, http://ct-morse.eu/strive-for-development-strengthening-resilience-to-violence-and-extremism-2/ .

[28] These include Global STRIVE projects funded under IcSP (Art 5) and implemented by the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund (GCERF) and the Hedayah International Centre of Excellence for Countering Violent Extremism.

[29] UN General Assembly, *Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism: Report of the Secretary-General*, A/70/674, 24 December 2015, para. 17.

[30] Joëlle Jenny, "Statement on behalf of the European Union and its Member States" (speech, New York, 1 June 2016), http://eu-un.europa.eu/eu-statement-united-nations-general-assembly-un-global-counter-terrorism-strategy/.

A crucial link between the EUGS and the UN's counterterrorism and PVE efforts lies in the important area of capacity building. UN norms continue to provide important guidance and direction to UN member states, but more work is needed to ensure that those norms translate into concrete actions on the ground. The EUGS explicitly states that when it comes to supporting resilience in its surrounding regions the EU "will cooperate with other international players, coordinating our work on capacity-building with the UN . . . in particular." By citing an array of PVE-relevant priorities including "deepening work on education, culture and youth to foster pluralism, coexistence and respect," [31] the EUGS provides a blueprint for engaging with UN actors beyond counterterrorism-specific entities, such as the Counterterrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF). The EU can leverage longstanding partnerships and relationships with an array of UN entities working on issues that align with the core objectives of the EUGS (supporting fulfilment of the SDGs worldwide, global governance, conflict resolution, regional cooperation, *inter alia*) providing important links that are relevant to preventing violent extremism without the need to put a PVE, CVE, or counterterrorism label on the continuation (or deeper investment in) that work going forward. In other words, the EUGS provides a framework from building on the EU's work with the UN that is understood as furthering the objective of preventing violent extremism without labelling it as such.

Strategic Diplomacy

Whether working with the UN or through other multilateral or bilateral partnerships, the EUGS emphasises the importance of engagement, highlighting that "the Union cannot pull up a drawbridge to ward off external threats. Retreat from the world only deprives us of the opportunities that a connected world presents."[32] The presence of some 140 EU Delegations around the world and the dialogues the EU convene regularly with governments and intergovernmental organisations provides the EU with the ability to promote internationally its Strategic vision and the values it embodies. Calling for investment in people on the ground, the EUGS calls for its Delegations to be better equipped "with the necessary expertise, including on sectoral issues."[33] More EU investment to develop local expertise on countering terrorism could be increased in this regard, especially by including more experts who could spend time in third countries. These experts should be well versed in the reform of civilian security agencies (such as police and intelligence services). They should also have a wider understanding of the strategic imperative of prevention so that expertise helps develop local capacity on community policing and civilian early warning for example are included and given sufficient emphasis to build trust with communities and aid P/CVE efforts as well.

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[31] European Union, *Shared Vision, Common Action,* p. 26.
[32] European Union, *Shared Vision, Common Action,* p. 17.
[33] European Union, *Shared Vision, Common Action,* p. 48.

It also provides an opportunity to take up another point highlighted in the EUGS and work with nongovernmental organisations and communities. With community engagement and resilience at the core of any effective P/CVE Strategy, a number of governments outside the EU are severely limiting the space for civil society to operate. Undue interference by authorities in countries such as Egypt, Ethiopia, and others undermines the implementation of key elements of the EUGS.

In fact, across the globe, trends for civil society-led programming and advocacy, including on P/CVE are bleak. We are witnessing some of the most severe government crackdowns on civil society in a generation. A key problem is that civil society is still not being given enough of a role when it comes to: a) harnessing the power of communities to prevent violent extremism at the local level; b) influencing national, regional, and multilateral strategies, policies, and programs to address the threat; or c) engaging in honest, safe discourse with states and international actors about policies and programmes that foment or feed into extremism, rather than ameliorating conditions.

In addition, there is clear indication that some states are using the PVE agenda itself to further limit the efforts of the independent civil society sector. This is counterproductive, as a vibrant and independent civil society sector that provides opportunity for interactions between and among diverse populations, and a space for constructive critical engagement with the state, is an essential pillar of prevention.

Too many states continue to view the challenge of violent extremism exclusively through a security lens and thus as one that should be addressed exclusively by national government actors, and principally the security sector. Despite the rhetoric in multilateral venues like the United Nations, national governments are too often reluctant to provide community actors the legal and political space to maximize their contributions to building local resilience against violent extremism and other forms of violence. More fundamentally, too many governments are mistrustful of civil society and actively restrict their ability to operate independently, if at all.

The EU should use its diplomatic presence and its political dialogues more often to raise concerns about oppression of and undue interference with civil society. The EU can also use its presence to support the early warning of threats coupled with assessments that can inform action to take measures that can prevent violent extremism. These measures include but are not limited to, allocating small grants, setting up pilot projects or reallocating resources to ensure that the most pressing concerns in vulnerable communities are addressed as a priority.

In addition, the EU should prioritize its support for efforts to allow civil society to better organize themselves on the range of P/CVE issues and advocate in national, regional and global settings for "whole of society" approaches to address violent extremism, in particular at the local level. Such approaches will not be effective if they are not adequately informed by the perspectives of diverse local actors and if the space for independent civil society activism continues to shrink. To this end, the EU should consider expanding its support – both political and financial – to initiatives designed to

allow for structured and systematic interaction between civil society and governments on a range of P/CVE issues, increased collaboration and cooperation among civil society organizations working in the P/CVE space (many of which are EU-funded, but tend not to look to collaborate with each other), and civil society voices and perspectives to be heard more regularly in multilateral policy and programming discussions around the P/CVE agenda.

Capacity Building

The EU has a vast array of instruments that it can use to support the aforementioned interventions, based on early warning information. The Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) is the mechanism that is used most often to support counterterrorism and P/CVE-specific programming, but EUGS widens the scope to allow more liberal use of other funds—including for example the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) to inject or increase support for police and justice sector reform and good governance; the European Development Fund (EDF); or the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) as well as the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa.

The door has recently been opened further with a decision by the Development Assistance Committee[34] (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Financial support from donors for certain PVE actions is now explicitly eligible as Official Development Assistance (ODA) when it is applied to specific, non-coercive actions, such as "education, activities that support the rule of law, working with civil society groups specifically to prevent radicalisation, building the capacity of security and justice systems."[35] Going forward this decision by the DAC facilitates more financial support for PVE and it also helps the EU and other donors gather data on P/CVE relevant programming and gain a better understanding of how they are contributing to P/CVE efforts without duplicating those efforts—and most importantly, without feeling compelled to put a counterterrorism or P/CVE label on actions that would suffer from any proclaimed association with security objectives.[36]

Policy development and coherence

One of the foremost experts on strategy, Richard Rumlet at the University of California, Los Angeles, makes a compelling case to support his argument that the key elements of a good strategy are threefold. It must contain: (1) a diagnosis that defines or explains the nature of the challenge, (2) a guiding-policy for dealing with the challenge, and (3) a set

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[34] Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), "DAC High Level Meeting Communique," 19 February 2016, http://www.oecd.org/dac/DAC-HLM-Communique-2016.pdf.
[35] OECD, "DAC High Level Meeting Communique," para. C25.
[36] The OECD disseminates data by theme and/or by country that provides indicators and insights on how development aid assistance is being implemented and what impact it is having. See for example: https://data.oecd.org/.

of coherent-actions that are designed to carry out the guiding-policy."[37] How does the EUGS stand up to this test?

First, as is noted in the introduction, the EUGS offers a sober and realistic view of the problems that the EU is facing when it comes to foreign and security policy, especially in the area of preventing and countering violent extremism. Second, guidance is offered by way of clear guiding principles in the EUGS (unity, engagement, responsibility, and partnership). These are followed by a set of priorities that range from security (including counterterrorism) to strategic communications. All of these are succinctly articulated and provide enough direction to follow when it comes to promoting resilience, taking an integrated and joined-up approach, as well as working with a wide array of governmental and nongovernmental partners. While guidance is sufficient in this regard, the issue of coherence is less obvious or accessible. Although the catalogue of existing thematic and geographic engagement by the EU is too vast to include in a single accessible document, the EUGS would benefit from some specific examples of, and references to, existing strategies and instruments that are being used to address the security challenges that provide the backdrop for the EUGS. How, for example, does the EU grapple with multifaceted problems that are influenced by hard security threats, such as terrorism in conjunction with radicalisation and the pressures of migration that all combine to feed extremist narratives and present a vexing challenge to practitioners and policymakers? The answer to this question is by no means straightforward, but having more examples of lessons learned or brief case studies as practical examples would help.

Implementation

The third element of Rumlet's good strategy (coherent actions), is always the most difficult to put in place and then measure. Essentially this refers to implementation and its attendant impact. The final section of the EUGS is titled "From Vision to Action." It starts with the importance of being credible. This is particularly important when implementing P/CVE programming. Working with civil society partners, as is advocated in the EUGS, helps to provide a link to communities that often raise less suspicion than interacting with governmental agencies.

In November 2016 the Council of the European Union received an Implementation Plan on Security and Defence as a proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice President of the European Commission, and Head of the European Defence Agency. The plan provides useful guidance with direct relevance to the subject of this paper with its focus on the need to improve the EU's "ability to respond early and effectively to conflicts and crises." It notes that "civilian or military experts can reinforce the EU Delegation's capacity of analysis and interaction in a state where there are risks of violence, instability or hybrid threats." Placing experts in Delegations around the world with intelligence gathering and analysis experience would not only help to build capacity, it would help the EU to employ an integrated approach.

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[37] Richard Rumlet, *Good Strategy/Bad Strategy: The Difference and Why it Matters* (New York: Random House, 2011).

More in-depth information about the nature and level of conflict in various stages will help to more finely tailor funding to ensure that resources are delivered in accordance with that information. The quality of that information would also be improved if the EU invested more in local early warning mechanisms with a civil society component[38], allowing for information from grassroots, community-level sources to provide a more localized and complete picture of the potential for violent conflict. The proposed EU increased investment in early warning would not only help to improve how EU funds are spent, it would also help local communities to help them identify early-warning indicators in preventing violence and to come up with initiatives that could help to build trust between security forces and local communities.

When it comes to addressing the threat from an external as well as an internal perspective (in accordance with the vision outlined in the EUGS), the challenge is not just how much money is available for counterterrorism and P/CVE programming, but understanding how current funds are being used across all the relevant EU instruments. This should also be accompanied by an assessment of where the money has led to real impact on the ground. The European Commission developed a "Mapping and Study on Counterterrorism Activities"[39] with the purpose of providing an "overview of the activities in the field of counterterrorism by the European Union externally within the three domains of capacity building of law enforcement and judiciary, countering the financing of terrorism, and countering violent extremism," it offers a solid basis to build upon so that it is aligned with the EUGS. The mapping was adapted to incorporate the broader scope of the EUGS and go beyond to provide a catalogue and an assessment of EU-funded programmes that are P/CVE-specific and P/CVE-relevant. The assessment could regularly updated under CT-MORSE[40] and it would aim to develop a more rigorous and context-specific set of indicators for monitoring and evaluating existing projects as well as determining where future funds could be needed to ensure measurable impact and return on investment.

Momentum is a less tangible element than money and therefore more difficult to track, but it is essential to ensure that the EUGS is carried without suffering the fate of the EES, which, according to Sven Biscop, "drove the agenda of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) for about a year or two—then its impact fizzled out."[41] Keeping the EUGS and its core priorities on the agenda for years to come will be essential inside and outside of Brussels, with EU Delegations, special representatives, EU Member States, as well as partners such as project implementers, all having an important role to play.

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[38] With a more robust civil society component that current early warning mechanisms, such as ECOWARN and CEWARN in West and East Africa Respectively.

[39] Copy on file with the author

[40] CT MORSE is a project that aims to strengthen the global delivery, coordination and coherence among the various CT projects financed by the European Union, as well as to reinforce the EU engagement within the Global Counter Terrorism Forum framework. CT MORSE has five key result areas: Monitoring; Coherence and Coordination; Recommendations to the EU; Expert analysis and awareness raising; and Visibility. The project is implemented by a consortium including the Institute for Security Studies, the Global Center on Cooperative Security, the International Counter-Terrorisms Centre - The Hague; and the Global Initiative against Transnational Orgnised Crime. The CT-Morse website is: http://ct-morse.eu/

[41] European Union and Institute for Security Studies, *Towards an EU Global Strategy,* p. 15.

The initiative articulated in the EUGS to regularly review and update it will help to keep the vision of the EUGS relevant.

Demonstrating impact and added value is also essential. This can be done by taking stock of achievements, highlighting concrete examples of good practices, and most importantly, by making better use of one of the core elements identified in the EUGS: strategic communications.

The EU should invest more in deliberately and systematically broadcasting around the world the work it is doing as one entity, rather than as a constellation of different silos. As noted, the EUGS explains that the "EU will live up to its values internally and externally: this is the strongest antidote we have against violent extremism."[42] That will only ring true if people inside and outside the EU are aware that principled engagement is actually happening.

Furthermore, the task of implementing the EUGS is increasingly important as the Trump Administration in the United States of America (and possibly other allies in the future) is rapidly enacting policies that contradict EU values such as tolerance and inclusion, and question the value of global institutions that advocate against measures such as the use of torture that undermine human rights. The EU has an important role to play and it has the tools it needs. The EUGS provides a strategic vision that is realistic about the threat yet mindful of the need to prevent it—by understanding underlying conditions and factors that contribute to it—in a holistic way. The challenge ahead will be implementing it.

Recommendations

1. **Invest more in early warning information to support implementation of EUGS's integrated approach.** The EU should gather more in-depth information about the nature and level of conflict in various stages. This will help to more finely tailor funding to ensure that resources are delivered in accordance with that information. Investing more in local early warning mechanisms with a civil society component would allow for information from grassroots, community-level sources to provide a more localized and complete picture of the potential for violent conflict and assess stages of conflict. The EU would therefore make an investment that would not only help to improve how EU funds are spent, it would also help local communities to identify early-warning indicators in preventing violence and to come up with initiatives that could help to build trust between security forces and local communities.

2. **Take stock of current EU Strategies that are relevant to CT and PVE, to ascertain where there are geographic gaps and where the threat has changed.** This will help to build upon the EUGS' own suggestion that current

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[42] European Union, *Shared Vision, Common Action,* p. 21.

Strategies should aligned with the EUGS and it would increase the level of geographic coverage. The stock taking would be informed by lessons that have emerged in the field and among researchers and practitioners and so that it is more up to date and in line with the joined-up and integrated approach articulated in the EUGS.

3. **Take stock and analyse the impact of P/CVE relevant projects**. This should build upon the mapping of counterterrorism projects undertaken by the European Commission. The assessment could be developed under CT-Morse and it would aim to develop a more rigorous and context-specific set of indicators for monitoring and evaluating existing projects as well as determining where future funds could be needed to ensure measurable impact and return on investment.

4. **Make use of the EU's diplomatic presence and its political dialogues to raise concerns with governments in third countries that are severely limiting the space for civil society to operate.**

5. **Invest more in strategic communications**, with a dedicated effort toward highlighting concrete examples of good practice on P/CVE programming in the context of implementing the EUGS. This would use the information developed in the aforementioned stocktaking work as well as data provided in real-time from delegations in the field. At the same time, the EUGS helps to provide a useful framework that links development and security together as complementary efforts, for the EU to communicate internally and externally when engaging with external partners.

6. **Prioritize its support for efforts to allow civil society to better organize themselves** better on the range of P/CVE issues and advocate in national, regional and global settings for "whole of society" approaches to address violent extremism, in particular at the local level.